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ARTICLES
FOREIGN AFFAIRS PROSECUTIONS
STEVEN ARRIGG KOH*
Contemporary global crime and cross-border law enforcement cooperation have
multiplied “foreign affairs prosecutions,” cases that encompass foreign apprehension, evidence gathering, and criminal conduct, as well as cases that implicate foreign nations’ criminal justice interests. Robert Mueller’s Russia investigation, the
fugitive Edward Snowden, and the cross-border crimes of FIFA and El Chapo all
exemplify such foreign affairs prosecutions. This Article argues that foreign affairs
prosecutions represent a consequential shift in U.S. criminal law, offering the
promise of closing global impunity gaps. At the same time, however, such cases risk
defendant interests at home and U.S. foreign policy abroad. This Article calls for
greater congressional engagement and judicial oversight to minimize such risks
while still promoting accountability for cross-border, cyber, and international
crime.
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INTRODUCTION
On April 2, 1990, U.S. law enforcement dramatically orchestrated
the kidnapping of physician Humberto Alv arez-Machain from
Mex ico, bringing him to the United States on charges of allegedly
participating in the torture and killing of a Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) agent in Mex ico.1 In a 6-3 decision, the U.S.
Supreme Court upheld the legality of this state-sponsored abduction,
tainting U.S. relations with Mex ico and triggering widespread condemnation from global media, foreign gov ernments, and scholars
alike.2 Justice Stev ens, writing for the dissent, called the decision
“monstrous” and accused the majority of unduly deferring to the
ex ecutiv e branch’s “intense interest in punishing[Alv arez-Machain] in
our courts.”3
Although the case seemed anomalous at the time, it foreshadowed a criminal legal trend: Today, more U.S. prosecutions than ev er
inv olv e criminal conduct, fugitiv es, and/or ev idence outside of the
United States, often touchingon the criminal justice interests of for1

United States v . Alv arez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 657 (1992).
Id. at 669–70; see, e.g., Jonathan A. Bush, How Did We Get Here? Foreign Abduction
After Alv arez-Machain, 45 STAN. L. REV. 939, 942 (1993) (“Neighboring countries like
Canada and most Latin American states, long-time friends including Switzerland and
Australia, and more predictable critics, such as Cuba and Iran, agreed with this assessment.
Internationally, v oices echoed the outrage of Justice Stev ens’s dissent, which branded the
decision ‘shocking’ and ‘monstrous.’” (footnotes omitted)); Michael J. Glennon, StateSponsored Abduction: A Comment on United States v . Alv arez-Machain, 86 AM. J. INT’L
L. 746, 747 (1992) (“[I]t would seem equally sensible to think that the Treaty sets out the
comprehensiv e and ex clusiv e legal means for the two countries to obtain custody of
criminal defendants from each other.”); Harold Hongju Koh, Protecting the Office of Legal
Counsel from Itself, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 513, 513 (1993) (agreeing with the dissent’s
characterization of the decision in Alvarez-Machain as “monstrous”); Anthony Lewis,
Abroad at Home; Whatever the King Wants, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 1992), https://
www.nytimes.com/1992/06/21/opinion/abroad-at-home-whatev er-the-king-wants.html
(“Nothingthe Supreme Court has done lately has aroused such widespread outrage, here
and abroad, as its decision that our Gov ernment had the right to kidnap a Mex ican suspect
and bringhim to this country for trial.”); see also infra Section II.B.1 (discussingAlvarezMachain in greater depth in the contex t of judicial deference in treaty interpretation). But
see Malv ina Halberstam, In Defense of the Supreme Court Decision in Alv arez-Machain,
86 AM. J. INT’L L. 736, 737 (1992) (“The Court’s holding is consistent with ex isting
international law, with its application of the Fourth Amendment to illegal arrests
domestically, and with the broad powers and deference that it has historically accorded to
the Ex ecutiv e in the conduct of foreign affairs.”).
3 Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 686 (Stev ens, J., dissenting).
2
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eign countries.4 This Article calls such cases foreign affairs prosecutions—criminal cases in which the ex ecutiv e branch engages its
prosecutorial power and foreign affairs power at the same time.5
Indeed, the case of Russian meddling in the 2016 U.S. presidential
election has become the archetype of how such cases hav e reached the
highest lev el of political prominence and public importance. And
other cases, such as the fugitiv e Edward Snowden and the 2014 Sony
hack, remind us that many of the most consequential criminal cases
today inv olv e some foreign nation because criminal conduct, ev idence, and/or a fugitiv e is located outside of U.S. territory.
This Article argues that foreign affairs prosecutions represent a
consequential shift in U.S. criminal law, offeringthe promise of promoting criminal accountability and closing global impunity gaps.6
Howev er, such cases also present two central normativ e risks. First,
they may undermine defendant interests when they ov erwhelm customary criminal process: In foreign affairs prosecutions, criminal
defendants can lawfully be kidnapped from abroad7 with ev idence
from another country obtained without a warrant8 and be prosecuted
for perpetratinga crime defined by the international community9 up
to three years after when the statute of limitations would typically
hav e run.10 Second, such cases may adv ersely impact U.S. foreign
policy, giv en that criminal inv estigation, indictment, and prosecution
unfold autonomously from traditional, foreign policy decisionmaking
mechanisms.
Foreign affairs prosecutions fall into an inadv ertent gap in legal
scholarship: Foreign affairs law generally ov erlooks criminal prosecu-
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See infra Section I.B.
As described further, infra Section II.B, ex ecutiv e branch engagement of its foreign
affairs power differentiates foreign affairs prosecutions from typical criminal prosecutions.
Indiv idual foreign affairs prosecutions need not necessarily hav e implications for
diplomacy or foreign policy.
6 As ex plained infra Section I.B, the accelerating rate of mov ement of people and
information across borders has catalyzed a new era of transnational crime in the twentyfirst century.
7 See, e.g., Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 669–70.
8 See, e.g., United States v . Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 261 (1990) (holdingthat
the Fourth Amendment does not apply to search and seizure by U.S. agents of property
that is owned by a non-resident and is located in a foreign country).
9 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (2012) (genocide); Conv ention on the Prev ention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 2, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter
Conv ention on Genocide] (paralleling the definition of genocide in 18 U.S.C. § 1091
(2012)).
10 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3292 (2012) (allowingsuspension of the statute of limitations up
to three years under certain circumstances).
5
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tions, while criminal law mostly ov erlooks foreign affairs.11 Criminal
legal scholarship is intensely preoccupied with the breadth of
prosecutorial power and discretion,12 but it has largely left unaddressed the ex pansion of such power in a growing body of transnational cases.13 Meanwhile, the v oluminous scholarship on
“ex traterritoriality”—cases in which courts apply U.S. statutes to conduct occurring abroad—has emphasized civ il cases.14 The emerging

05/14/2019 08:58:42

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3398955

41254-nyu_94-3 Sheet No. 17 Side A

11 By foreign affairs law, I mean the “constitutional, statutory, and common law rules
and doctrines that regulate how the United States interacts with the rest of the world.”
Curtis A. Bradley, Foreign Relations Law and the Purported Shift Away from
“Exceptionalism,” 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 294, 294 (2015).
12 See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Is Chev ron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV.
L. REV. 469, 469 (1996) (arguing that prosecutors should be giv en Chevron deference in
the interpretation of federal criminal law); Daniel C. Richman, Accounting for Prosecutors,
in PROSECUTORS AND DEMOCRACY: A CROSS-NATIONAL STUDY 40 (Máx imo Langer &
Dav id Alan Sklansky eds., 2017) (considering the role prosecutors play in promoting
democratic citizenship and the democratic means of holding prosecutors to account);
Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement
Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757, 758–59 (1999) (cautioningagainst reform proposals that
would upset political decisions about prosecutorial power and enforcement of federal
criminal law); Daniel C. Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their
Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 751–52 (2003) (modelingthe relationship between
agents and prosecutors); Dav id Alan Sklansky, The Nature and Function of Prosecutorial
Power, 106 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 473, 477 (2016) [hereinafter Sklansky,
Prosecutorial Power] (complicating the picture for prosecutorial reform proposals by
modeling the mediating role of prosecutors); Dav id Alan Sklansky, The Problems with
Prosecutors, 1 ANN. REV. CRIMINOLOGY 451, 452 (2018) (discussingproblematic aspects of
prosecutorial power, including discretion, illegality, ideology, unaccountability,
organizational inertia, and role ambiguity).
13 By transnational, I mean cases inv olv ing“law which regulates actions or ev ents that
transcend national frontiers.” PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 2 (1956).
14 See, e.g., Pamela K. Bookman, Litigation Isolationism, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1081,
1090–99 (2015) (considering U.S. courts’ av oidance of transnational litigation in cases
concerning personal jurisdiction, forum non conv eniens, abstention comity, and the
presumption against ex traterritoriality); Gary B. Born, A Reappraisal of the Extraterritorial
Reach of U.S. Law, 24 L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1, 2 (1992) (arguingthat an “international
law” presumption is the most v iable alternativ e to the territoriality presumption); Zachary
D. Clopton, Replacing the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1, 21–45
(2014) (considering replacements for the presumption against ex traterritoriality in civ il,
criminal, and administrativ e law cases); Anthony J. Colangelo, A Unified Approach to
Extraterritoriality, 97 VA. L. REV. 1019, 1022 (2011) (arguingfor rootingex traterritoriality
statutory construction and due process analyses in the sources of Congress’s lawmaking
power); Franklin A. Gev urtz, Determining Extraterritoriality, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV.
341, 377–407 (2014) (consideringan international relations rationale for the presumption
against ex traterritoriality). But see Zachary D. Clopton, Bowman Lives: The
Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Criminal Law After Morrison v . National Australia
Bank, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 137, 160–72 (2011) [hereinafter Clopton, Bowman
Lives] (considering the dev elopment of the presumption against ex traterritoriality in
criminal cases under application of the Supreme Court’s 1922 decision in United States v.
Bowman); Julie Rose O’Sulliv an, The Extraterritorial Application of Federal Criminal
Statutes: Analytical Roadmap, Normative Conclusions, and a Plea to Congress for
Direction, 106 GEO. L.J. 1021, 1069–95 (2018) (dev elopinga framework for understanding
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scholarship on criminal ex traterritoriality, some of which ev en recognizes such cases as “an instrument of national security policy,”15 has
focused on discrete issues, such as due process limitations on ex traterritorial criminal legislativ e jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction,16 the
borderlessness of electronic data,17 and increasingcongressional reliance on the Offences Clause and Foreign Commerce Clause to
criminalize foreign conduct.18 Other scholars analyze the global
dynamics of the risingglobal frequency of a particular crime and suggest law and policy prescriptions to combat it,19 while literature on

05/14/2019 08:58:42
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criminal ex traterritoriality and calling for congressional interv ention to clarify the
ex traterritorial scope of federal criminal statutes).
15 Michael Farbiarz, Accuracy and Adjudication: The Promise of Extraterritorial Due
Process, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 625, 626 (2016).
16 See Michael Farbiarz, Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction, 114 MICH. L. REV. 507,
516–17 (2016) (describing how due process limits ex traterritorial legislativ e jurisdiction);
Farbiarz, supra note 15, at 627 (arguingfor due process limits on personal jurisdiction in
ex traterritorial criminal cases).
17 See, e.g., Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data, 125 YALE L.J. 326, 365–78
(2015).
18 See Sarah H. Clev eland & William S. Dodge, Defining and Punishing Offenses Under
Treaties, 124 YALE L.J. 2202, 2264 (2015) (identifyingthe Offenses Clause as an additional
source of Congress’s constitutional authority to implement certain treaty commitments);
Anthony J. Colangelo, The Foreign Commerce Clause, 96 VA. L. REV. 949, 951 (2010)
(considering the nature of congressional power under the Foreign Commerce Clause);
Beth Stephens, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Congress’s Power to “Define and Punish
. . . Offenses Against the Law of Nations,” 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 447, 454 (2000)
(ex ploringthe modern dispute and historical contex t of the Offenses Clause); DANIEL C.
RICHMAN, KATE STITH & WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, DEFINING FEDERAL CRIMES (unpublished
manuscript) (manuscript ch. 2, at 32) (on file with New York Univ ersity Law Rev iew)
(noting that issues of both foreign policy and international law may be implicated in
Foreign Commerce Clause cases). In a forthcoming article, Pierre-Hugues Verdier also
addresses an “unprecedented wav e” of U.S. criminal cases against foreign banks for
activ ities occurring abroad. See Pierre-Hugues Verdier, The New Financial
Extraterritoriality, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming2019).
19 See, e.g., Tara Helfman, Marauders in the Courts: Why the Federal Courts Have Got
the Problem of Maritime Piracy (Partly) Wrong, 62 SYRACUSE L. REV. 53 (2012) (maritime
piracy); James I.K. Knapp, Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties as a Way to Pierce Bank
Secrecy, 20 CASE WESTERN RES. J. INT’L L. 405 (1988) (bank secrecy); Regina Menachery
Paulose, Beyond the Core: Incorporating Transnational Crimes into the Rome Statute, 21
CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 77, 78–79 (2012) (transnational organized crime); M.
Sornarajah, Transnational Crimes: The Third Limb of the Criminal Law, 2004 SING. J.
LEGAL STUD. 390, 390, 395–96 (transnational organized crime); Dav id Weissbrodt, CyberConflict, Cyber-Crime, and Cyber-Espionage, 22 MINN. J. INT’L L. 347 (2013) (cyber
offenses); Andrew Keane Woods, Against Data Exceptionalism, 68 STAN. L. REV. 729
(2016) (data and the cloud); Eileen Ov erbaugh, Comment, Human Trafficking: The Need
for Federal Prosecution of Accused Traffickers, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 635 (2009)
(human trafficking). The long-standingdebate about Guantanamo, detention, and the war
on terror has similarly pointed to prosecutions in Article III courts as the preferred mode
of promotingaccountability. See, e.g., Wesley S. McCann, Indefinite Detention in the War
on Terror: Why the Criminal Justice System Is the Answer, 12 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV.
109, 110 (2015) (“[T]he American criminal justice system holds the key to resolv ingmany
of these aforementioned issues.”); Laura K. Donohue, Terrorism Trials in Article III
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multilateral cooperation focuses solely on the mechanics of inv estigation and ex tradition.20 Finally, recent foreign affairs scholarship has
not squarely addressed criminal law enforcement, focusingmore often
on national security cases in the Bush and Obama administrations.21
None of the abov e characterizations accurately capture that these are
all unified concepts playingout in criminal cases where the ex ecutiv e
acts as both prosecutor and diplomat.22

05/14/2019 08:58:42
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Courts, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 105, 106 (2015) (“Article III courts hav e routinely,
and successfully, managed international and domestic terrorist cases.”); see also Robert M.
Chesney, Beyond the Battlefield, Beyond Al Qaeda: The Destabilizing Legal Architecture of
Counterterrorism, 112 MICH. L. REV. 163, 167–68 (2013) (arguingthat the second post-9/11
decade will destabilize U.S. gov ernment use of military detention and lethal force in the
counterterrorism setting). This Article focuses on such prosecutions, as opposed to
national security-related cases playingout in other fora.
20 See, e.g., Roberto Iraola, Statutes of Limitations and International Extradition, 2010
MICH. ST. L. REV. 103, 103–04 (ex amining application of statutes of limitations to
ex tradition requests); Yonatan L. Moskowitz, MLATS and the Trusted Nation Club: The
Proper Cost of Membership, 41 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE, no. 2, 2016, at 1, 1–2, https://cpbus-w2.wpmucdn.com/campuspress.yale.edu/dist/8/1581/files/2016/09/moskowitz-macrofinished-1-1s9v mcy.pdf (proposingways Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties can address the
increase of ev idence requests from foreign jurisdictions).
21 See, e.g., Deborah N. Pearlstein, After Deference: Formalizing the Judicial Power for
Foreign Relations Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 783, 785 (2011) (discussing interpretation of
national security-related treaties and statutes); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein,
Chev ronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1170, 1218–27 (2007) (focusing on
difficult deference questions in the War on Terror); see also Daniel Abebe, Great Power
Politics and the Structure of Foreign Relations Law, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 125, 125–26 (2009)
(suggesting that American unipolar hegemony may be contributing to lower lev els of
judicial deference to the ex ecutiv e).
22 Most helpfully, Dav id Luban, Julie O’Sulliv an, and Dav id Stewart hav e brought
together criminal procedure, transnational crime, and international crime into one subject
of study. See generally DAVID LUBAN, JULIE R. O’SULLIVAN, & DAVID P. STEWART,
INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (2d ed. 2014) (discussing
procedural issues in transnational crime and international crime). This Article builds on
such systematic work by ex ploring the implications of this sytem in indiv idual cases,
unifying foreign relations law and judicial deference, defendant interests and criminal
process, and foreign policy ramifications. Additionally, a relativ ely small number of
commentators outside of the United States hav e recognized the rise of transnational crimes
as triggering a network of treaties and other agreements to criminalize shared criminal
definitions and enhance cooperation. See, e.g., ROBERT J. CURRIE & JOSEPH RIKHOF,
INTERNATIONAL & TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (2012) (rev iewing the rise of
international and transnational criminal law enforcement in Canada); Neil Boister,
“Transnational Criminal Law”?, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 953, 956 (2003) (arguing for the
recognition of the field of transnational criminal law, one distinct from international
criminal law). And courts hav e observ ed that the “complex ities inherent in transnational
criminal law enforcement can be v ex ing: ordinary tasks like securingthe presence of the
defendant, collectingev idence, and enforcinga judgment are transformed into hurdles that
are difficult, or impossible, to pass.” See In re Hijazi, 589 F.3d 401, 403 (7th Cir. 2009); see
also Stephanie Clifford, Growing Body of Law Allows Prosecution of Foreign Citizens on
U.S. Soil, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/10/nyregion/
growing-body-of-law-allows-prosecution-of-foreign-citizens-on-us-soil.html?_r=0 (“Usinga
growingbody of law that allows the United States to prosecute foreign citizens for some
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This Article builds on this scholarship by definingforeign affairs
prosecutions and consideringtheir normativ ely desirable and undesirable consequences for U.S. criminal law and foreign policy. In Part I,
this Article defines foreign affairs prosecutions, ex plains why such
cases hav e multiplied, and affirms their necessity. Part II then demonstrates how such cases may undermine defendant interests. Specifically, it shows that the U.S. prosecutor often acts as a prox y for
another nation when adv ocating for the interpretation of a relev ant
U.S. criminal treaty or statute; the judiciary then typically confers
heightened deference on this ex ecutiv e interpretation. Part III raises
the additional concern of foreign affairs prosecutions’ adv erse effects
on U.S. foreign policy. Part IV prescribes solutions to address these
normativ e concerns.
I
FOREIGN AFFAIRS PROSECUTIONS: A CONSEQUENTIAL
SHIFT IN U.S. CRIMINAL LAW
Foreign affairs prosecutions represent a consequential shift in
U.S. criminal law, offering an emerging model for combatting rising
global crime. This Part makes this central argument by defining foreign affairs prosecutions and ex plainingtheir proliferation.
A. Defining Foreign Affairs Prosecutions
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actions, the gov ernment has been turning the federal courts into international lawenforcement arenas.”).
23 Indictment, United States v . Netyksho, No. 1:18-cr-00215-ABJ (D.D.C. July 13,
2018); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Grand Jury Indicts 12 Russian Intelligence
Officers for Hacking Offenses Related to the 2016 Election (July 13, 2018), https://
www.justice.gov /opa/pr/grand-jury-indicts-12-russian-intelligence-officers-hackingoffenses-related-2016-election; see also Indictment at 2–3, United States v . Internet
Research Agency, LLC, No. 1:18-cr-00032-DLF (D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2018) (indictingv arious
Russian companies and indiv iduals for “fraud and deceit for the purpose of interfering
with the U.S. political and elections process”); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Grand

41254-nyu_94-3 Sheet No. 18 Side B

The classical conception of prosecution is familiar. The ex ecutiv e
branch has the power and discretion to inv estigate and prosecute indiv iduals whom it alleges hav e perpetrated crimes defined pursuant to
statute. Such classical prosecutions typically occur in the district in
which the crime occurred, with ev idence and witnesses hailing from
that same location.
Foreign affairs prosecutions differ from this classical conception.
Consider the following ex ample: On July 13, 2018, the U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ) announced that a grand jury in
Washington, D.C., had returned an indictment presented by Special
Counsel Robert Mueller.23 The indictment charges thirteen Russian
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Jury Indicts Thirteen Russian Indiv iduals and Three Russian Companies for Scheme to
Interfere in the United States Political System (Feb. 16, 2018) (announcingthe indictment),
https://www.justice.gov /opa/pr/grand-jury-indicts-thirteen-russian-indiv iduals-and-threerussian-companies-scheme-interfere.
24 See Indictment at 2, United States v . Netyksho, No. 1:18-cr-00215-ABJ (D.D.C. July
13, 2018); Adam Goldman, Justice Dept. Accuses Russians of Interfering in Midterm
Elections, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/19/us/politics/
russia-interference-midterm-elections.html.
25 While public information on the inv estigativ e steps are unav ailable, the followingis
inferred based on the author’s knowledge of transnational criminal inv estigations.
26 See Stev en Arrigg Koh, The Trump-Bolton Misdirection on Russian Extradition:
Plenty of Legal Options Exist to Gain Custody of Russian Suspects, JUST SECURITY (July
16, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/59474/trump-bolton-misdirection-russianex tradition-plenty-legal-options-ex ist-gain-custody-russian-suspects.
27 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Seeks to Recov er Approx imately
$540 Million Obtained from Corruption Inv olv ingMalaysian Sov ereign Wealth Fund (June
15, 2017), https://www.justice.gov /opa/pr/us-seeks-recov er-approx imately-540-millionobtained-corruption-inv olv ing-malaysian-sov ereign (describing the criminal inv estigation
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intelligence officers with committingfederal crimes intended to interfere with the 2016 U.S. presidential election.24
How did Mueller’s team adv ance its inv estigation to the indictment stage?25 First, it inv estigated ev ents that occurred in the United
States, for ex ample by rev iewing the electronic records of the
Democratic National Committee’s computer networks. Second, it
inv estigated conduct abroad, such as how the twelv e defendants
workingfor the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, a
Russian Federation intelligence agency, engaged a network of computers located in countries around the world. In doing so, Mueller’s
team likely both engaged U.S. agents abroad and coordinated with
law enforcement in foreign countries. Third, it confirmed that the relev ant federal statutes criminalized ex traterritorial conduct, i.e., conduct
occurringabroad. Finally, it needed to consider how to take custody
of the indicted indiv iduals, whether through ex tradition or
otherwise.26
In other words, for Mueller’s team to ex ecute its inv estigation, it
needed to operate within a pre-ex istingframework of treaty, statute,
procedure, case law, and institutional capacity, all of which empower
U.S. law enforcement institutions to inv estigate transnational crime.
The indictments represent not only the climax of months of inv estigation by federal law enforcement, but also the culmination of years of
ev olution of U.S. criminal law to enable it to inv estigate, indict, and—
ultimately—prosecute indiv iduals who nev er set foot on U.S. soil but
nonetheless committed crimes strikingat the heart of U.S. democracy.
While the Mueller inv estigation regularly garners front-page
headlines, it is far from unusual. Today, U.S. criminal cases frequently
hav e a nex us to a foreign nation,27 which demands that the ex ecutiv e
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into the alleged misappropriation of more than $4.5 billion in funds belongingto 1Malaysia
Dev elopment Berhad).
28 This Article largely focuses on federal criminal cases and the dual function of the
federal ex ecutiv e as prosecutor and diplomat. The cross-border nature of these cases
differentiates them from more typical federal criminal cases, which necessarily hav e some
federal nex us but do not engage the ex ecutiv e’s foreign relations power. Future research,
howev er, could focus on these cases in state and local fora. Additional scholarship could
also ex plore the federalism implications of such cases, giv en that state and local law
enforcement authorities are increasingly recruiting federal gov ernment actors to engage
with foreign nations for purposes of adv ancing inv estigation and prosecution. Along this
dimension, responsibility for enforcement of criminal law may be shiftingfrom the states to
the federal gov ernment. For more information, see infra notes 57–65 and accompanying
tex t.
29 See, e.g., United States v . Demirtas, 204 F. Supp. 3d 158, 168 (D.D.C. 2016) (dual
Dutch-Turkish citizen ex tradited from Germany to the United States on terrorism-related
charges).
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branch engage its prosecutorial and foreign affairs powers concurrently to adv ance the case to conv iction.28 Although such cases are
quite v ariegated, they may possess one or more of the followingelements, each of which is sufficient to render a case a foreign affairs
prosecution:
First, foreign affairs prosecutions may depend on another sov ereign to apprehend the fugitive or obtain evidence.29 Suppose a man
shoots and kills a woman on a Manhattan street. The New York Police
Department (NYPD) inv estigates the crime by inspecting bullet casings, rev iewingsurv eillance v ideo footage from an adjoiningbank, and
interv iewingeyewitnesses present at the moment the crime is perpetrated. After further inv estigation, NYPD learns that the man has fled
to Canada. The Manhattan District Attorney’s Office contacts the
DOJ, which in turn and in conjunction with the U.S. Department of
State, ex tradites the man out of Canada with the assistance of the
Canadian gov ernment. Or, as another ex ample, a bank employee in
Houston, Tex as is suspected of usingsophisticated electronic methods
to siphon money out of U.S. bank accounts and transfer it to bank
accounts in Switzerland. The DOJ makes a mutual legal assistance
request to Switzerland for relev ant bank records showing wire fraud
and also applies to toll the statute of limitations while it awaits this
ev idence. The Swiss bank records are ultimately the basis for her
indictment and the key ev idence leadingto her subsequent conv iction.
Second, foreign affairs prosecutions include cases in which the
substantiv e offense at issue encompasses criminal conduct that itself
occurred abroad and in which the relev ant U.S. statute criminalizes
such ex traterritorial conduct. The international community may hav e
also defined such crimes pursuant to treaty, potentially ov erlapping
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with one of the “core crimes” of international criminal courts.30 Consider, for ex ample, a man who trav els to Thailand in order to engage
in sex ual relations with minors. Upon return to the United States, he
is prosecuted and ultimately conv icted for such conduct, all of which
occurred outside of the United States, under 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b),
which proscribes trav el in foreign commerce for purposes of engaging
in sex ual acts with minors.31 Or take as another ex ample a SerbianAmerican who is prosecuted in the United States for crimes committed during the Yugoslav ian wars in the 1990s. The prosecution
relies on 18 U.S.C. § 1091, which defines genocide and was incorporated into the U.S. Code in 1988 after U.S. ratification of the
Conv ention on the Prev ention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide.32
Third, foreign affairs prosecutions may otherwise implicate foreign nations’ criminal justice interests, including U.S. prosecution of
foreign nationals and/or crimes ov er which other countries would hav e
criminal jurisdiction. For ex ample, the United States prosecutes a
French national under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act for bribing
Brazilian gov ernment officials while working for a U.S. company in
Brazil.33 The case implicates criminal conduct ov er which Brazil would
hav e territorial jurisdiction and, possibly, ov er which France could
assert nationality jurisdiction.34 It would also implicate French interests in consular access to the defendant pursuant to the Vienna
Conv ention on Consular Relations.35
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30 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 5, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute] (limiting the International Criminal Court’s
jurisdiction to genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression).
31 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a)–(b) (2012).
32 Id. § 1091; Conv ention on Genocide, supra note 9.
33 See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (2012).
34 See Geoffrey R. Watson, Offenders Abroad: The Case for Nationality-Based Criminal
Jurisdiction, 17 YALE J. INT’L L. 41, 43 (1992) (discussing “fiv e bases for ex traterritorial
jurisdiction,” includingnationality jurisdiction).
35 See Vienna Conv ention on Consular Relations art. 36, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77,
596 U.N.T.S. 261. The hypotheticals abov e underscore that foreign affairs prosecutions
need not constitute crimes that are inherently transnational, such as human trafficking
across national borders. Nor need they inv olv e only foreign nationals. For ex ample, a
foreign affairs prosecution may inv olv e a U.S. national charged with purely domestic
conduct who then escapes to a foreign country, triggering foreign affairs implications
because of the logistics of apprehendingher from abroad. And the gov ernment may assert
jurisdiction ov er a person on a number of bases, including ov er someone who has
committed a crime within U.S. territory (territorial jurisdiction), a U.S. national engaging
in criminal conduct abroad (nationality jurisdiction), or a foreign national who has
committed an international crime (univ ersal jurisdiction). See Watson, supra note 34, at 43.
And foreign affairs prosecutions ex clude those takingplace outside of Article III, state, or
local courts, such as those in the Guantanamo military commissions. While the
Guantanamo cases undoubtedly implicate some of the same issues, they largely inv olv e the
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Do these elements really create a unitary category of cases? It is
true that the case of a U.S. national who flees to Mex ico after committinga purely local drugtraffickingoperation may present legally distinct transnational issues from that of a Russian national in Russian
territory interfering with U.S. elections. Howev er, at a high lev el of
generality, an inclusiv e category of foreign affairs prosecutions
remains analytically useful because it focuses on the way cross-border
considerations materially alter U.S. criminal process.36 In both the
New York murder and Russian election interference cases, for
ex ample, ex tradition and foreign conduct may influence which crimes
are charged.37 They also redound to the same normativ e benefit,
namely, enabling the United States to inv estigate and/or prosecute;
without a v alid ex tradition treaty or ex traterritorial criminal statutes,
for ex ample, such cases would be impossible.38 Finally, they raise the
same potential normativ e risks. For ex ample, a Mex ican delay or
denial of a U.S. ex tradition request could negativ ely impact bilateral
diplomatic relations, as could—for obv ious reasons—prosecution of
Russian intelligence officials.
Furthermore, the elements need not arise in isolation; often, they
ov erlap within a single criminal case. For instance, the case of Joaquı́n
Archiv aldo Guzmán Loera (“El Chapo”) encompasses all three of the
abov e elements. On January 19, 2017, the ev e of President Trump’s
inauguration, Mex ico ex tradited El Chapo to the United States on
charges of operatinga continuingcriminal enterprise and other drugrelated charges.39 Chapo, a Mex ican national and head of the Sinaloa
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lex specialis of the laws of war in a sui generis forum. See generally The Guantanamo Trials,
HUM. RIGHTS WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/guantanamo-trials (last updated Aug. 9, 2018)
(describing the use of Guantanamo Bay in military commissions to try detainees for
v iolations of the laws of war). Of course, the Guantanamo cases likely represent another
ex ample of the ex ecutiv e branch wieldingits foreign affairs authority to materially adapt
classical criminal prosecutions from orthodox process. While such dynamics are too far
afield for purposes of the present article, future scholarship could consider their creation
from a foreign affairs prosecution lens.
36 As will be seen infra Section II.B.2, classifying cases as “ex traterritorial” or
“territorial” has prov en challenging and unhelpful. Foreign affairs prosecutions helpfully
transcend such monikers and prov ide a more coherent category whose systematic analysis
can help lawyers, judges, and scholars alike.
37 The charges in the drugtraffickingcase may be constrained, for ex ample, by the rule
of specialty, which would restrict U.S. prosecution to the charges on which the Mex ican
courts had granted ex tradition. See infra note 177 and accompanyingtex t. In the case of
the Russian hackers, the Department of Justice (DOJ) may only charge under statutes that
criminalize ex traterritorial conduct.
38 See 18 U.S.C. § 3181(a) (2012) (requiringa treaty in order to ex tradite); see also, e.g.,
Small v . United States, 544 U.S. 385 (2005) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) does not
apply to foreign conv ictions).
39 Azam Ahmed, El Chapo, Mexican Drug Kingpin, Is Extradited to U.S., N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/19/world/el-chapo-ex tradited-
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drug cartel, had escaped from Mex ican custody in 2001, only to be
arrested and incarcerated again in 2014.40 Duringthis period, Mex ico
resisted ex traditing Guzmán on charges of drug trafficking and
murder.41 Howev er, after El Chapo’s second prison escape in 2015
and re-arrest in 2016, the Mex ican gov ernment decided to ex tradite
him to the United States.42 In February 2019, after a three-month trial,
El Chapo was found guilty on all counts.43 In sum, this case possessed
all three elements of a foreign affairs prosecution: a fugitiv e who was
located in Mex ico, had perpetrated crimes there, and whose U.S. pretrial detention and prosecution directly impacted Mex ico’s criminal
justice interests.
This categorization raises a final question: Are foreign affairs
prosecutions a new phenomenon? Some may point to the longhistory
of piracy prosecutions in the United States,44 the century-plus history
of ex tradition treaties,45 or ev en well-known historical prosecutions in
this, or other, countries with significant foreign policy implications,
such as the Israeli prosecution of Adolf Eichmann in the 1960s46 or
the Roman Polanski case in the 1970s.47 Regardless of such history, in
the twenty-first century, foreign affairs prosecutions hav e rapidly
dev eloped into a distinctiv e category of cases that are increasing in
frequency, number, and complex ity—and thus warrant systematic
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mex ico.html; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Joaquı́n “El Chapo” Guzmán Loera
Faces Charges in New York for Leading a Continuing Criminal Enterprise and Other
Drug-Related Charges (Jan. 20, 2017), https://www.justice.gov /opa/pr/joaquin-el-chapoguzman-loera-faces-charges-new-york-leading-continuing-criminal-enterprise.
40 See Tim Weiner, Mexican Jail Easy to Flee: Just Pay Up, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2001),
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/29/world/mex ican-jail-easy-to-flee-just-pay-up.html.
41 Clare Ribando Seelke, June S. Beittel & Liana W. Rosen, “El Chapo” Guzmán’s
Extradition: What’s Next for U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation?, CRS INSIGHT (Feb. 3,
2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IN10326.pdf (“Following Guzmán’s 2014 capture by
Mex ican marines supported by U.S. intelligence, the Mex ican gov ernment was resistant to
ex tradite Guzmán to the United States.”).
42 Ahmed, supra note 39.
43 Alan Feuer, El Chapo Found Guilty on All Counts; Faces Life in Prison, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/12/nyregion/el-chapo-v erdict.html.
44 See, e.g., Eugene Kontorov ich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s
Hollow Foundation, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 183, 186 (2004) (challenging “the generally
accepted v iew that piracy was univ ersally cognizable because of its heinousness,” thus
callinginto doubt modern rationales for univ ersal jurisdiction).
45 See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW
AND PRACTICE 42–43 (6th ed. 2014) (rev iewingthe history of U.S. ex tradition treaties since
the late 1800s).
46 See HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF
EVIL 220–52 (Penguin Books 1994) (1963) (describingthe Israeli trial of Adolf Eichmann,
who had fled to Argentina after committingwar crimes in Nazi Germany and beyond).
47 See John R. Crook, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 654, 673 (2010) (rev iewingthe history of, and more
recent dev elopments in, the Polanski ex tradition).
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study.48 An apt analogy is to the concept of globalization: Although it
was historically always true that trade, capital, and labor crossed borders, the acceleration of such trends in the late twentieth century prov ided an opportunity to analyze a qualitativ ely distinct era of
transnational integration under the banner of “globalization.”
B. The Necessity of a New Paradigm
Plainly, foreign affairs prosecutions represent a consequential,
necessary shift in U.S. criminal law. Such cases address one of the central concerns of international criminal law: that global crime metastasizes more rapidly than any domestic or international institution can
legally adapt to promote criminal accountability, creating impunity
gaps.49
Two ex amples underscore the role that foreign affairs prosecutions play in closing such impunity gaps, i.e., where a U.S. criminal
prosecution addresses a cross-jurisdictional need to prosecute certain
criminal conduct. First, in the early morning of May 27, 2015, plainclothes Swiss police officers arrested sev en senior International
Federation of Association Football (FIFA) officials on the ev e of their
congress in Zurich.50 They did so at the request of the United States,
based on a forty-sev en-count indictment unsealed that same day in the
Eastern District of New York, which charged fourteen defendants
with, inter alia, racketeering, wire fraud, and money laundering conspiracies in connection with the FIFA defendants’ participation in a
twenty-four-year scheme to enrich themselv es through the corruption
of international soccer.51 Many countries lauded the United States for
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48 Pierre-Hugues Verdier has made a similar argument regarding the recent wav e of
foreign affairs prosecutions regardingforeign banks. Verdier, supra note 18, at 11.
49 See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 30, Pmbl. (“Affirming that the most serious
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished and
that their effectiv e prosecution must be ensured by takingmeasures at the national lev el
and by enhancinginternational cooperation . . . .”); Justice Hassan B. Jallow, Prosecutor,
United Nations Int’l Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and United Nations Int’l Residual
Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, Closing the Impunity Gap, Address at the 6th
INTERPOL International Ex pert Meetingon Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes Against
Humanity (Apr. 14, 2014), http://www.unmict.org/sites/default/files/statements-andspeeches/140414_prosecutor_jallow_interpol_en.pdf (emphasizing the need to strengthen
the role of national jurisdictions, alongside international tribunals, in closingimpunity gaps
for perpetrators of international crimes).
50 Owen Gibson & Damien Gayle, Fifa Officials Arrested on Corruption Charges as
World Cup Inquiry Launched, GUARDIAN (May 27, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/
football/2015/may/27/sev eral-top-fifa-officials-arrested.
51 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Nine FIFA Officials and Fiv e Corporate
Ex ecutiv es Indicted for RacketeeringConspiracy and Corruption (May 27, 2015), https://
www.justice.gov /opa/pr/nine-fifa-officials-and-fiv e-corporate-ex ecutiv es-indictedracketeering-conspiracy-and.
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finally holding accountable what was widely recognized around the
world to be a corrupt organization.52 Or, as a second ex ample, in 2008
Charles “Chuckie” Taylor, Jr.—son of former Liberian President
Charles Taylor—was conv icted of perpetrating torture while serv ing
as head of the Liberian Anti-Terrorism Unit from 1999 to 2002.53 The
first indiv idual to be prosecuted under the Torture Act,54 Taylor, a
U.S. national, was taken into U.S. custody upon entering the Miami
International Airport in 2006.55 The case was hailed as a v ictory for
criminal accountability because, at the time, no international tribunal
ex isted that had territorial jurisdiction ov er crimes committed in
Liberia before 2002, and prosecution in Liberian courts was unlikely.56
The FIFA and Taylor cases ex emplify the transnational and international criminal challenge to national criminal justice systems. Since
the 1970s, countries hav e increasingly confronted the challenge of
effectiv ely combatting transnational crime.57 In the twenty-first cen-
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52 See, e.g., M.V., How America Is Pursuing FIFA, ECONOMIST (June 1, 2015), https://
www.economist.com/the-economist-ex plains/2015/06/01/how-america-is-pursuing-fifa
(“America has a longhistory of beingtougher on white-collar crime and corruption than
other countries. . . . Most of Europe is happy, believ ingthat FIFA has longbeen a cesspit
of corruption in desperate need of fresh faces and reform.”); Ben Wright, Fifa Is About to
Learn a Stern Lesson About the Vigour of American Prosecution, TELEGRAPH (May 27,
2015), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/international/11632230/Fifa-about-tolearn-a-stern-lesson-about-the-v igour-of-American-prosecution.html (“There’s been more
than a whiff of malfeasance hanging around Fifa [sic] for years now. . . . And yet most
countries appeared powerless to do anything about it, perhaps . . . because they weren’t
prepared to make the necessary sacrifices for their principles.”).
53 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Roy Belfast Jr. A/K/A Chuckie Taylor
Conv icted on Torture Charges (Oct. 30, 2008), https://www.justice.gov /archiv e/opa/pr/2008/
October/08-crm-971.html.
54 Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A (2012) (definingtorture).
55 Q & A: Charles “Chuckie” Taylor, Jr.’s Trial in the United States for Torture
Committed in Liberia, HUM. RIGHTS WATCH (Sept. 23, 2008), https://www.hrw.org/news/
2008/09/23/q-charles-chuckie-taylor-jrs-trial-united-states-torture-committed-liberia. On
appeal, the Elev enth Circuit held that Congress had acted constitutionally when it passed
the Torture Act to implement the Conv ention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) after U.S. ratification. United States v .
Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 806 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Applyingthe rational relationship test in this
case, we are satisfied that the Torture Act is a v alid ex ercise of congressional power under
the Necessary and Proper Clause, because the Torture Act tracks the prov isions of the
CAT in all material respects.”).
56 See, e.g., HUM. RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 55.
57 The concept of “transnational crime” arose in the 1970s, first amongst international
relations theorists, and then in both the Fifth U.N. Congress on Crime Prev ention and the
Treatment of Offenders (1975) and the Fourth U.N. Surv ey of Crime Trends and
Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (1976). See NEIL BOISTER, AN INTRODUCTION TO
TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 3–4 (2012). Though the unav ailability and unreliability of
crime statistics represents a challenge to understanding the scope of transnational crime,
the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, the main administrativ e organ in the U.N. criminal
justice system, has amassed a report on the globalization of crime. UNITED NATIONS
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tury in particular, the accelerating rate of mov ement of people and
information across borders has catalyzed a new era of global crime.58
Today, national jurisdictions are combating cross-border criminal
activ ity such as human trafficking, money laundering, migrant smuggling, drugand firearms trafficking, and maritime piracy.59 As stated
by an Obama Administration Assistant Attorney General headingthe
DOJ Criminal Div ision, a central, contemporary issue for U.S. law
enforcement is “when criminal schemes cross international borders,”
thus “requir[ing] international cooperation to be successful.”60 DOJ
has stated that foreign requests to the United States for ev idence
within U.S. territory hav e increased by six ty percent, while requests
for electronic ev idence hav e increased tenfold.61 This tracks broader
transnational trends within the U.S. courts: Justice Breyer’s recent
book, entitled The Court and the World, notes that it is now common
that two of the six cases argued weekly before the Supreme Court
inv olv e foreign activ ity.62 Cyberspace has further facilitated crossborder crime, enabling those who hav e not ev en set foot in the
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OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, THE GLOBALIZATION OF CRIME: A TRANSNATIONAL
ORGANIZED CRIME THREAT ASSESSMENT (2010).
58 O’Sulliv an, supra note 14, at 1024 (“With the ex plosion in cross-border criminality
made possible by modern technology and transportation systems, the globalization of
commerce and finance, and the Internet, these are issues that courts attempt to answer on
a daily basis.”).
59 See UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 57, at 1 (including
some of these ex amples in a non-ex haustiv e list of transnational organized crime). See
generally BOISTER, supra note 57, at 27–132 (rev iewing different types of transnational
crime); CURRIE & RIKHOF, supra note 22, at 325–436; JOHN KERRY, THE NEW WAR 18–19
(1997) (acknowledging that transnational crimes hav e become a security threat for the
United States and the world); DAVID P. STEWART, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW IN A
NUTSHELL 267–68 (2014) (notingthe increase of transnational crime and the difficulties for
indiv idual states to deal with such crime); Edgardo Rotman, The Globalization of Criminal
Violence, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 8–24 (2000) (consideringthe dev elopment of
transnational organized crime and terrorism, including specific types of crime and their
relationship to local crime); Bruce Zagaris, International Enforcement Law Trends for 2010
and Beyond: Can the Cops Keep Up with the Criminals?, 34 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV.
1, 2 (2011) (discussinginternational white collar crime).
60 Leslie R. Caldwell, U.S. Assistant Attorney Gen., Remarks at the CCIPS-CSIS
Cybercrime Symposium 2016: Cooperation and Electronic Ev idence Gathering Across
Borders (June 6, 2016), https://www.justice.gov /opa/speech/assistant-attorney-generalleslie-r-caldwell-speaks-ccips-csis-cybercrime-symposium-2016 (“[T]wo emerging
challenges to public safety and national security [are] the challenge posed when criminals
use new technologies to v ictimize innocent people and av oid accountability [and] when
criminal schemes cross international borders and legitimate law enforcement efforts . . .
require international cooperation to be successful.”).
61 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2015 BUDGET REQUEST: MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE
TREATY PROCESS REFORM, https://www.justice.gov /sites/default/files/jmd/legacy/2014/07/
13/mut-legal-assist.pdf (last v isited Feb. 16, 2019).
62 STEPHEN BREYER, THE COURT AND THE WORLD: AMERICAN LAW AND THE NEW
GLOBAL REALITIES 3–4 (2015).
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country to perpetrate crimes in or concerning the United States.63
Thus, the U.S. criminal justice system has become more aware that
while its borders delimit the geographical boundaries of its enforcement jurisdiction, criminality increasingly transcends such borders.64
These borders now represent an adv antage for criminals, who ex ploit
“national sanctuaries” to liv e in impunity.65
Until now, a disproportionate amount of scholarly attention has
understandably focused on the role that international tribunals play in
addressing this problem. And yet these tribunals are dwindling in
number, and the principal remaining tribunal—the International
Criminal Court (ICC)—is facingstructural problems of capacity, state
cooperation, and Rome Statute ratification.66 Furthermore, many cri-
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63 See PWC, U.S. CYBERSECURITY: PROGRESS STALLED, KEY FINDINGS FROM THE
2015 U.S. STATE OF CYBERCRIME SURVEY 3 (2015), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/increasingit-effectiv eness/publications/assets/2015-us-cybercrime-surv ey.pdf (“Cybersecurity
incidents are not only increasing in number, they are also becoming progressiv ely
destructiv e and target a broadening array of information and attack v ectors.”). For
ex ample, North Korea is suspected to hav e hacked into Sony Pictures Entertainment’s
system, destroyed parts of it, and stolen personal and commercial data. Press Release, FBI,
Update on Sony Inv estigation (Dec. 19, 2014), https://www.fbi.gov /news/pressrel/pressreleases/update-on-sony-inv estigation. The attack also rendered thousands of computers
inoperable and disrupted the company’s business operations. Id. The preliminary
inv estigation from the FBI suggested North Korean inv olv ement, giv en the malware used
in the attack, internet protocol addresses used, and similarities to prev ious attacks against
South Korean banks and media outlets. See id. In September 2019, the United States
charged a North Korean spy with computer fraud and wire fraud after a years-long
inv estigation. See Dav id E. Sanger & Katie Benner, U.S. Accuses North Korea of Plot to
Hurt Economy as Spy Is Charged in Sony Hack, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.
nytimes.com/2018/09/06/us/politics/north-korea-sony-hack-wannacry-indictment.html.
More recently, Venezuela ex tradited to the United States a Cuban national indicted for
hacking into the Univ ersity of Pittsburgh Medical Center database and using such
information to file almost a thousand fraudulent tax returns and redeem them through
Amazon.com. See Joe Mandak, Cuban Man Pleads Not Guilty to UPMC ID Theft Charges,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Aug. 19, 2016), https://www.post-gazette.com/business/
healthcare-business/2016/08/19/Cuban-man-pleads-not-guilty-to-US-hospital-ID-theftcharges-UPMC-Pittsburgh/stories/201608190235.
64 See BOISTER, supra note 57, at 3 (noting that criminals appear to work in a
borderless world while still usingborders to their adv antage).
65 Id.
66 See Beth Van Schaack, International Justice Year-in-Review: Looking Backwards,
Looking Forwards (Part 2), JUST SECURITY (Jan. 19, 2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/
28870/international-criminal-justice-2015-part-2/ (“[The ICC] is plagued by challenges to
its legitimacy, erratic state cooperation, and persistent perceptions of inefficacy and
inefficiency. . . . [T]here is an enduring need for the international community to create,
enable, and support additional accountability mechanisms. . . .”); see also Olympia Bekou,
Building National Capacity for the ICC: Prospects and Challenges, in THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT IN SEARCH OF ITS PURPOSE AND IDENTITY 133, 133 (Triestino
Mariniello ed., 2015) (“Ov er 10 years hav e passed since the Court became operational and
with such passing of time came the realization that, due to the high numbers of both
v ictims and perpetrators, the ICC is simply unable to deal with each and ev ery case that
may arise in situations of mass atrocity.”). Other ex isting tribunals, such as the Special
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tique its administration of justice as being ex pensiv e, slow, and/or
prone to judicial error giv en that it is still maturingas an institution.67
More generally, some commentators are critiquing the entire antiimpunity project,68 while broader populist and nationalist trends are
threateningex istinginternational legal institutions and may thwart the
creation of new international and regional criminal justice mechanisms.69 Despite this, scholars and practitioners hav e argued for the
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Tribunal for Lebanon, Ex traordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Kosov o
Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office, are limited in institutional lifespan
and jurisdiction, with some closing in the near future. See generally Harry Hobbs,
International Criminal Justice Redux: A New Wave of Hybrid Courts, JUST. CONFLICT
(Mar. 13, 2018), https://justiceinconflict.org/2018/03/13/international-criminal-justice-redux a-new-wav e-of-hybrid-courts (rev iewing the modern history of hybrid criminal tribunals,
includingthose relatingto Sierra Leone, Cambodia, Lebanon, Central African Republic,
and Kosov o); see also ECCC AT A GLANCE, EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS
OF CAMBODIA (2014), https://www.eccc.gov .kh/sites/default/files/ECCC%20at%20a%
20Glance%20-%20EN%20-%20April%202014_FINAL.pdf (illustrating set timeframe of
Cambodia’s criminal tribunal); Frequently Asked Questions, KOS. SPECIALIST CHAMBERS
& SPECIALIST PROSECUTOR’S OFF., https://www.scp-ks.org/en/newsmedia/frequentlyasked-questions (last v isited Feb. 16, 2019) (ex plaining limited life span of Kosov o
tribunal).
67 See, e.g., Daniel Abebe, Opinion, I.C.C.’s Dismal Record Comes at Too High a Price,
N.Y. TIMES: ROOM FOR DEBATE (Dec. 12, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/
2014/12/11/do-we-need-the-international-criminal-court/iccs-dismal-record-comes-at-toohigh-a-price (“Since 2002, the court has spent ov er $1 billion, with a yearly budget of ov er
$100 million, all for 36 indictments, two conv ictions and six acquittals, with sev eral
decisions pending. Two conv ictions hardly constitute a serious deterrent and one wonders
if it is money well spent.”); Leila N. Sadat, Fiddling While Rome Burns? The Appeals
Chamber’s Curious Decision in Prosecutor v . Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, EJIL: TALK!
(June 12, 2018), https://www.ejiltalk.org/fiddling-while-rome-burns-the-appeals-chamberscurious-decision-in-prosecutor-v -jean-pierre-bemba-gombo (“Much of the decision to
acquit [Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo] rests upon a controv ersy about which charges were
actually confirmed and tried . . . . No matter which side is ‘correct’ about this issue, the fact
that 8 judges of the Court . . . could not agree upon this fundamental and simple point
represents a complete failure of the Court’s judicial process.”).
68 See, e.g., ANTI-IMPUNITY AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA (Karen Engle, Zinaida
Miller & D.M. Dav is eds., 2016) (questioning the human rights mov ements’ turn to
criminal prosecution); Karen Engle, Anti-Impunity and the Turn to Criminal Law in
Human Rights, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 1069, 1070–71 (2015) (same).
69 See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Liberal Internationalism and the Populist Backlash, 49
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 795, 795 (2017) (“An upswingin populist sentiment around the world poses
the greatest threat to liberal international legal institutions since the Cold War.”); Kenneth
Roth, The Dangerous Rise of Populism: Global Attacks on Human Rights Values, in
WORLD REPORT 2017 1, 1 (Human Rights Watch ed., 2017) (discussingthe rise of populism
and threat to accomplishments of the modern human rights mov ement). But see Andrew
Hudson & Alex andra W. Taylor, The International Commission Against Impunity in
Guatemala: A New Model for International Criminal Justice Mechanisms, 8 J. INT’L CRIM.
JUST. 53 (2010); Are International Tribunals Running Out of Steam?, ECONOMIST (Jan. 29,
2019), https://www.economist.com/europe/2019/01/26/are-international-tribunals-runningout-of-steam (describingnew hybrid criminal courts established in recent years to address
crimes in Kosov o, Senegal, and South Sudan); Ayen Bior, John Tanza, & Dimo Silv a, South
Sudan Inches Closer to Hybrid Court on Conflict’s Four-Year Anniversary, VOA (Dec. 17,
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establishment of international tribunals to prosecute, inter alia,
piracy,70 cybercrime,71 nuclear smuggling,72 and transnational economic crime.73 Puttingaside the merits of such proposals, the international criminal legal literature itself recognizes international tribunals
as a second-best approach, giv en that, ideally, criminal justice should
always be local.74 For this reason, the ICC will only hear a case if a
member state is unwillingor unable to genuinely carry out an inv estigation or prosecution.75 Foreign affairs prosecutions thus dov etail with
the work of international courts and in many instances are preferable
for purposes of inv estigatingand prosecutingcross-border, cyber, and
international crime.76 To better and more systematically understand
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2017), https://www.v oanews.com/a/south-sudan-inches-closer-to-hybrid-court/4167383.
html; Teri Schultz, Syrian War Crimes Accountability Mechanism Short on Funds, DW
(Mar. 16, 2018), https://www.dw.com/en/syrian-war-crimes-accountability-mechanismshort-on-funds/a-43001282.
70 See, e.g., James D. Fry, Towards an International Piracy Tribunal: Curing the Legal
Limbo of Captured Pirates, 22 AFR. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 341, 341 (2014) (suggestingthe
establishment of an international judicial body to aid in deterring piracy through
prosecution).
71 See, e.g., Weissbrodt, supra note 19, at 368–69 (rev iewing the proposal for an
international tribunal on cyber crimes).
72 See, e.g., Leonard S. Spector, Nuclear Material and Commodity Trafficking as
International Crimes: Current Status, Gaps in Coverage, and Potential Steps Forward, 105
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 133, 137 (2011) (“Another still more challenging approach,
which French President Nicolas Sarkozy broached at the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit,
would be to create a new international tribunal [to adjudicate nuclear trafficking
offenses].”).
73 See, e.g., Lucinda A. Low et al., The “Demand Side” of Transnational Bribery and
Corruption: Why Leveling the Playing Field on the Supply Side Isn’t Enough, 84 FORDHAM
L. REV. 563, 589 (2015) (“One option to combat demand-side bribery would be a new
international criminal tribunal for transnational economic crime with jurisdiction ov er
grand corruption, money laundering, fraud, and other serious organized criminal activ ities
of a transnational nature . . . .”).
74 See Antonio Cassese, The Rationale for International Criminal Justice, in THE
OXFORD COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 123, 123 (Antonio Cassese
ed., 2009) (notingthat the best forum for a criminal prosecution is the court of the territory
where the crime has been committed).
75 See Rome Statute, supra note 30, art. 17; ANDREW NOVAK, THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: AN INTRODUCTION 54–56 (2015) (discussing the principle of ICC
complementarity with national courts). This contrasts with the ad hoc tribunals, for
ex ample, which had primary jurisdiction ov er national courts. See S.C. Res. 955, annex art.
8, ¶ 2 (Nov . 8, 1994) (“The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall hav e primacy ov er the
national courts of all States.”); U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General
Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), annex art. 9, ¶ 2, U.N.
Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993) (“The International Tribunal [for the former Yugoslav ia] shall
hav e primacy ov er national courts.”); NOVAK, supra, at 55.
76 The United States is not alone in pursuing foreign affairs prosecutions; other
countries are modifyingtheir criminal laws and procedures to increase their ex traterritorial
criminal reach. See, e.g., Frederick T. Dav is, Where Are We Today in the International Fight
Against Overseas Corruption: An Historical Perspective, and Two Problems Going
Forward, 23 INT’L L. STUDENTS ASS’N J. INT’L & COMP. L. 337, 340 (2017) (discussing
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the shift that foreign affairs prosecutions represent in U.S. criminal
law, let us consider how the U.S. political branches are rightly
changing U.S. criminal law and procedure to address this issue. This
change is occurringalongtwo fronts, aligningwith both domestic and
foreign interests.
First, the political branches hav e adv anced domestic criminal justice interests.77 They hav e created a global network of bilateral and
multilateral treaties to facilitate domestic prosecutions. It is well
known that the United States has ratified sev eral multilateral treaties
that define certain transnational and international crimes and obligate
states to ex tradite or prosecute alleged perpetrators of such crimes.78
Less discussed is the dense network of bilateral treaties regulatinglaw
enforcement cooperation around ex tradition and mutual legal assistance. State Department and DOJ negotiators lead this process,79
meetingwith foreign counterparts to negotiate such treaties based on
ex isting models and, in some instances, negotiating new treaties to
replace those that are outdated.80 Once such treaties hav e been negotiated, the President always ratifies them with the adv ice and consent
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French legislativ e efforts to address ov erseas bribery). Future scholarship should consider
the dynamics of this growing web of ov erlapping jurisdictions engaging in such crossborder law enforcement.
77 While both political branches are integral to the law- and treaty-making processes,
the ex ecutiv e branch in particular has catalyzed changes to criminal treaty, statute, and
procedure. As discussed in more detail below, see infra notes 99–102 and accompanying
tex t, this resembles the ex ecutiv e branch’s lead in initiating other changes to federal
criminal law. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH.
L. REV. 505, 544–45 (2001) (“[F]ederal criminal legislation often begins with the Justice
Department and responds to pressure from that department. . . . [I]f the Justice
Department says federal prosecutors need a giv en statute in order to punish serious
criminals, the claim will hav e immediate credibility with the public . . . .”).
78 See, e.g., United Nations Conv ention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances art. 7(1), Dec. 20, 1988, 1582 U.N.T.S. 165 (“The Parties shall
afford one another, pursuant to this article, the widest measure of mutual legal assistance
in inv estigations, prosecutions and judicial proceedings in relation to criminal offences
established in accordance with article 3, paragraph 1.”).
79 See Daniel Abebe & Eric A. Posner, The Flaws of Foreign Affairs Legalism, 51 VA.
J. INT’L L. 507, 533–34 (2011).
80 See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-958, EXTRADITION TO AND FROM THE UNITED
STATES: OVERVIEW OF THE LAW AND CONTEMPORARY TREATIES 5 (2016), https://www.
ev erycrsreport.com/files/20161004_98-958_53c6c09c590214876fb5959c6fdb0d78942b5cc6.
pdf (“Although the United States periodically renegotiates replacements or supplements
for ex istingtreaties to make contemporary adjustments, the United States has a number of
treaties that pre-date the dissolution of a colonial bond or some other adjustment in
gov ernmental status.”); Office of International Affairs, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (June 9, 2015),
https://www.justice.gov /criminal-oia/office-international-affairs (“OIA is responsible, along
with the Department of State, for the negotiation of bilateral ex tradition and legal
assistance treaties and multilateral law enforcement conv entions.”).
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of the Senate.81 Indeed, despite a widespread scholarly claim that
Article II treaty-makinghas slowed, the U.S. gov ernment continues to
ratify bilateral law enforcement treaties apace. In the last three years
alone, the United States has ratified ex tradition treaties with the
Dominican Republic and Chile, as well as mutual legal assistance treaties with Algeria and Kazakhstan, the latter occurring during the
Trump Administration.82 In fact, as Oona Hathaway has noted, ex tradition is the “foremost” area of law in which the political branches
hav e used the Article II treaty process.83
Beyond treatymaking, this adv ancement of domestic interests
also encompasses changes to federal statutes and procedure necessary
to close impunity gaps. Since the enactment of Title 18 of the U.S.
Code in 1948, for ex ample, each decade has witnessed the enactment
of more federal statutes ex plicitly proscribing ex traterritorial conduct—not fewer.84 In many instances, DOJ and U.S. Attorneys’
Offices (USAOs) call for such federal criminal legislation.85 For
ex ample, DOJ adv ocated for the enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 3292,
which authorizes the ex tension of the statute of limitations due to the
delays inherent in obtainingev idence pursuant to mutual legal assistance.86 Another familiar ex ample is a push for laws criminalizingforeign bribery by U.S. companies, which led to the passage of the
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81 Andy Olson, Senate Foreign Relations Comm., Speech at the 112th Annual Meeting
of the American Society of International Law (Apr. 6, 2018).
82 See 2016 Treaties and Agreements, U.S. DEP’T STATE, https://www.state.gov /s/l/
treaty/tias/2016 (last v isited Jan. 13, 2019) (mutual legal assistance treaty with Kazakhstan);
2017 Treaties and Agreements, U.S. DEP’T STATE, https://www.state.gov /s/l/treaty/tias/2017/
index .htm (last v isited Jan. 13, 2019) (mutual legal assistance treaty with Algeria); John
Bellinger, Senate Approves Two More Treaties, Bringing Obama Administration’s Treaty
Record to Fifteen, LAWFARE (July 16, 2016, 3:34 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/senateapprov es-two-more-treaties-bringing-obama-administrations-treaty-record-fifteen (noting
Senate approv al of ex tradition treaties with Chile and the Dominican Republic); Daily Log
of Senate Activ ity, U.S. SENATE PRESS GALLERY (July 14, 2016), http://www.dailypress.
senate.gov /?p=11799 (same); see also Treaty with Jordan on Mutual Legal Assistance in
Criminal Matters, Jordan-U.S., Oct. 1, 2013, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 114-4 (2015), https://
www.congress.gov /treaty-document/114th-congress/4.
83 See Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of International
Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1261 (2008).
84 See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 94-166, EXTRATERRITORIAL
APPLICATION OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW 42–52 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/94166.pdf (listingfederal criminal laws with ex traterritorial application). An initial surv ey of
these ex traterritorial statutes rev eals the increasing inclusion of ex press ex traterritorial
language in more recent decades, both as amendments to prior-enacted laws and as part of
newly enacted prov isions. See id.
85 See Stuntz, supra note 77, at 544–45 (notingthat both Congress and the public will
giv e great weight to the concerns and demands of federal prosecutors).
86 See H.R. REP. NO. 98-907, at 2 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3578, 3579
(“Deputy Assistant Attorney General Mark M. Richard, in testimony before the
subcommittee on criminal justice, illustrated the difficulties confronting federal
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Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, and the OECD Conv ention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions, which came into force in 1999.87 And in the last
decade, DOJ has adv ocated for amendment of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure to allow for a broader ex ecutiv e and/or judicial
power to summons business organizations located abroad,88 turn ov er
grand jury materials to foreign law enforcement,89 take depositions
abroad in the absence of the defendant,90 subpoena U.S. nationals
abroad,91 take testimony of indiv iduals not in open court,92 and issue
search warrants for property outside of the United States.93 More generally, Rules 1 (scope and definitions), 5 (initial appearance), 26.1
(foreign law determination), and 58 (petty offenses and other misdemeanors) all now hav e some nex us to foreign states.94
Second, the political branches are adaptingU.S. criminal law and
procedure to address impunity gaps bearing on other nations’ inter-
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prosecutors. He cited the ex ample of a prosecution that required records located in
Switzerland and three other countries.”).
87 See MICHAEL V. SEITZINGER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41466, FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT (FCPA): CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST AND EXECUTIVE ENFORCEMENT, IN
BRIEF 1 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41466.pdf (“Gov ernment officials and
administrators contended that more direct prohibitions on foreign bribery and more
detailed requirements concerning corporate recordkeeping and accountability were
needed to deal effectiv ely with the problem [of illegal payments by United States
corporations to foreign gov ernment officials].”).
88 See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 4(c)(3)(D) (outlining procedures for summonsing an
organization not within a judicial district of the United States); JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE U.S., COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL RULES 2 (2015), https://www.uscourts.gov /sites/default/files/
2015-05-criminal_rules_report_0.pdf (“The proposed amendment originated in an October
2012 letter from Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer, who adv ised the Committee
that Rule 4 now poses an obstacle to the prosecution of foreign corporations that hav e
committed offenses that may be punished in the United States.”).
89 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(A) (authorizingdisclosure of grand jury matters to foreign
gov ernments).
90 FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(c)(3) (permitting the taking of depositions outside the United
States without the defendant’s presence under certain circumstances).
91 See 28 U.S.C. § 1783 (2012) (“A court of the United States may order the issuance of
a subpoena requiringthe appearance as a witness before it . . . of a national or resident of
the United States who is in a foreign country . . . .”); FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(e)(2) (notingthat
28 U.S.C. § 1783 gov erns serv ice of subpoenas on a witness in a foreign country).
92 FED. R. CRIM. P. 26 (noting that trial testimony must be in open court unless
otherwise prov ided in rules).
93 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(5) (permitting magistrate judges to issue a warrant for
property located outside of the jurisdiction of any state or district).
94 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 1(a)(5) (ex cludingcertain proceedings from application of the
FRCP because they are gov erned separately by treaties and/or statutes prov idingthe rules
based on treaty authority); FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(c)(4), (d)(1)(F) (gov erning initial
appearances for persons ex tradited and consular rights for felony cases); FED. R. CRIM. P.
26.1 (foreign law determination); FED. R. CRIM. P. 58(b)(2)(H) (consular rights for petty
offenses and other misdemeanors).
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ests. For ex ample, the United States amended the Mann Act to
criminalize the act of trav elingor conspiringto trav el abroad with the
intent to engage in sex ual activ ity with a minor, in part because of an
awareness of the effects of such trav el on Thailand.95 Sometimes this
accommodation manifests itself in a change in prosecutorial priorities
within the ex istingstatutory structure, such as the recent U.S. practice
of ex traditingdrugtraffickers from Colombia and prosecutingthem as
part of a broader engagement to assist Colombia in its battle against
narcotics.96 This accommodation may be particularly useful when prov idingassistance to countries that hav e a lesser capacity to effectuate
foreign affairs prosecutions due to legal impediments, lack of
resources, or both. For instance, cooperation between the United
States, Brazil, and Switzerland has led to the guilty pleas of
Odebrecht, a global construction conglomerate, and Braskem S.A., a
Brazilian petrochemical company, both of which agreed to pay a combined $3.5 billion in penalties due to their roles in a global bribery
scheme of public officials.97 The corruption scandal and inv estigation
are the largest in the history of Latin America, implicating, inter alia, a
Colombian senator, a former v ice president of Ecuador, Venezuelan
President Nicolás Maduro, former Brazilian President Luiz Inácio
Lula da Silv a, and three former Peruv ian presidents, including one
forced to resign in March 2018.98
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95 See Vickie F. Li, Comment, Child Sex Tourism to Thailand: The Role of the United
States as a Consumer Country, 4 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 505, 505–06 (1995) (analyzingthe
effects of sex tourism on Thailand and the role of consumer countries like the United
States).
96 See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION SUBMITTED
TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO SECTION 3203 OF THE EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL ACT,
2000, AS ENACTED IN THE MILITARY CONSTRUCTION APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2001, PUBLIC
LAW 106-246 RELATED TO PLAN COLOMBIA (2001), https://www.state.gov /s/l/16162.htm
(rev iewingex tradition practice with Central and South American countries as part of the
counternarcotics assistance effort under Plan Colombia); see also Farbiarz, Extraterritorial
Criminal Jurisdiction, supra note 16, at 513 (notingthe many Colombian ex traditions, as
well as ex traterritorial prosecutions of Iranian weapons procurement).
97 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Odebrecht and Braskem Plead Guilty and
Agree to Pay at Least $3.5 Billion in Global Penalties to Resolv e Largest Foreign Bribery
Case in History (Dec. 21, 2016), https://www.justice.gov /opa/pr/odebrecht-and-braskemplead-guilty-and-agree-pay-least-35-billion-global-penalties-resolv e.
98 See Anthony Faiola, The Corruption Scandal Started in Brazil. Now It’s Wreaking
Havoc in Peru., WASH. POST (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_
americas/the-corruption-scandal-started-in-brazil-now-its-wreaking-hav oc-in-peru/2018/01/
23/0f9bc4ca-fad2-11e7-9b5d-bbf0da31214d_story.html?utm_term=.f99c77953f0c; Simeon
Tegel, The Corruption Scandal That’s Ensnared Not One, but Three Peruvian Presidents,
WASH. POST (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/thecorruption-scandal-thats-ensnared-not-one-but-three-peruv ian-presidents/2018/03/22/
7d15a75a-2c50-11e8-8dc9-3b51e028b845_story.html?utm_term=.d1687b01b189.
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Although it is analytically useful to understand the abov e changes
to U.S. law from both domestic and foreign perspectiv es, it is often
difficult to isolate the ex plicit and implicit motiv ations that may animate U.S. policymakers in this regard. Often, ex ecutiv e branch officials espouse a desire to promote criminal accountability.99 But the
political branches may also v iew such laws as a tool for fosteringdiplomatic relations, or a means of spreading the American empire.100
Such v aried motiv ations may also animate domestic and foreign criminal justice actors. For ex ample, it is an adv antage for both U.S. law
enforcement and U.S. foreign policy to detain and prosecute El
Chapo, an indiv idual who has escaped from Mex ican detention twice
and prev iously committed crimes in both Mex ico and the United
States; it similarly inured to the benefit of the gov ernment of Mex ico
to ex tradite Chapo to the United States.101 Suffice it to say, howev er,
that U.S. criminal law is increasingly global, giv en U.S. gov ernment
preoccupation to some degree with both domestic and foreign crime.
Such legal adaptations inv ariably lead to increasing numbers of foreign affairs prosecutions.
In sum, inv estigation and prosecution by indiv idual states
represent the most promisingapproach for closingimpunity gaps and
promotingcriminal accountability.102 Recent changes to U.S. criminal
law and procedure help redress criminality both domestically and in
foreign states. Rather than creating ev er more international institutions, the more effectiv e paradigm is to globalize ex isting domestic
criminal legal institutions to address cross-border, cyber, and international crime.

TO

DEFENDANT

While foreign affairs prosecutions close impunity gaps, they may
also undermine defendant interests and ev en raise the specter of ov er99
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See, e.g., Caldwell, supra note 60.
See KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG?: THE
EVOLUTION OF TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW 180 (2009) (“In short, ex traterritorial
policing and ex traterritorial regulation in the postwar era both demonstrate an often
ov erlooked face of postwar American hegemony: a marked willingness to project power
and law, sometimes unilaterally, within the territorial borders of other sov ereign states in
an effort to better control and deter transboundary threats.”).
101 The Mex ican gov ernment may av oid public criticism for more prisoner escapes,
outsource law enforcement to the United States, and av oid corruption-related reforms.
102 As discussed infra Part III, not all states offer the same promise, giv en foreign affairs
prosecutions are outward projections of both the strengths and weaknesses of domestic
criminal justice systems.
100
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whelmingcustomary criminal process. Such risk first deriv es from the
new and amended treaty, statute, and procedure at issue in these
cases; in many instances, these changes foster the inv olv ement of foreign nations’ ex ecutiv e branches, which further bolsters U.S.
prosecutorial authority. Heightened judicial deference then contributes to further ex ecutiv e aggrandizement.
A. Formal Rule Changes and the “Supercharged” Executive

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3398955

05/14/2019 08:58:42

103 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 4(c)(3)(C) adv isory committee’s note to 2016 amendment
(“Giv en the realities of today’s global economy, electronic communication, and federal
criminal practice, the mailing requirement should not shield a defendant organization
when the Rule’s core objectiv e—notice of pending criminal proceedings—is
accomplished.”).
104 See 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) (2012).
105 See id. § 3292. Passed in 1984, just sev en years after ratification of the first mutual
legal assistance treaty, § 3292 represents a significant departure from the fiv e-year statute
of limitations period first prescribed in 1954. See An Act to Prohibit Payment of Annuities
to Officers and Employees of the United States Conv icted of Certain Offenses, and for
Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 83-769, § 10(a), 68 Stat. 1142, 1145 (1954); see also Paul D.
Swanson, Note, Limitless Limitations: How War Overwhelms Criminal Statutes of
Limitations, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1557, 1563 & n.37 (2012) (listing18 U.S.C. § 3292 as an
ex ample of a tollingmechanism that allows dev iation from the 1954 fiv e-year limitations
period). It constitutes one of sev eral criminal statutory tolling ex ceptions to apply
generally to all criminal statutes of limitations, and equitable tollingis v ery rare in criminal
cases. Id. at 1563 n.37.
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The new and amended treaty, statute, and procedure described
abov e represent the first step in potentially aggrandizingthe ex ecutiv e
in foreign affairs prosecutions. As discussed abov e, many of these
formal black-letter rule changes are necessary and normativ ely desirable. For ex ample, in 2016 the Adv isory Committee on Rules eliminated a requirement in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 4 that a
summons serv ed on an organization be mailed to a last known U.S.
address, giv en that, increasingly, organizations committing crimes in
the United States hav e nev er had a physical address in U.S.
territory.103
Howev er, such changes may also demonstrably shift power
towards prosecutors in both subtle and ov ert ways. Take, for ex ample,
statute of limitation prov isions in foreign affairs prosecutions. Generally, for non-capital offenses, the gov ernment must indict an accused
within fiv e years of commission of the criminal conduct.104 Howev er,
in foreign affairs prosecutions, statutes of limitations for such offenses
may in fact be suspended for up to three years, giv ingthe gov ernment
a total of eight years—as opposed to fiv e—to indict.105 Pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 3292, the United States may apply to the district court before
which a grand jury is impaneled and show that ev idence of an offense
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18 U.S.C. § 3292(a).
Id. The official request may take many forms, includingthat of a letter rogatory or
treaty-based mutual legal assistance request. Id. § 3292(d).
108 Tyler T. Ochoa & Andrew J. Wistrich, The Puzzling Purposes of Statutes of
Limitation, 28 PAC. L.J. 453 (1997) (discussing the v arious policies fav oring statutes of
limitations).
109 Statutes of limitation prov ide “the primary guarantee against bringing ov erly stale
criminal charges.” United States v . Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322 (1971) (citingUnited States
v . Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 122 (1966)). The Due Process clause plays a “limited role” in
protecting against oppressiv e pre-trial delay, whereas Six th Amendment speedy trial
protections attach after a person has been accused of a crime. See United States v .
Lov asco, 431 U.S. 783, 789 (1977); see also Marion, 404 U.S. at 312. A defendant mov ing
for dismissal of the charges due to pre-indictment delay must establish actual prejudice and
that the gov ernment engaged in intentional delay to gain a tactical adv antage. Marion, 404
U.S. at 325–26; Lovasco, 432 U.S. at 795. Giv en such a limited constitutional backstop, the
political branches hav e considerable leeway in modifyingstatutes of limitation. And while
such changes may not inherently v iolate constitutional rights, in most cases, defendants’
interests are more pressured when the state has a longer time window in which to
prosecute.
107
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is in a foreign country.106 If the court finds that the United States has
officially requested such ev idence and that the ev idence is in fact
abroad, it will then toll the statute of limitations for up to three
years.107
Section 3292 ex emplifies how nov el federal statutes, while necessary to effectuate a foreign affairs prosecution, potentially undermine
defendant interests. On one hand, obtaining ev idence abroad takes
more time than it does in the United States. At the same time, the
domestic policy rationales for statutes of limitations are unchanged for
indiv idual defendants: Statutes of limitations are useful for, inter alia,
promoting repose, minimizing the deterioration of ev idence, placing
defendants on an equal footing, and encouragingprompt enforcement
of the law.108 A statute of limitations ex tended by six ty percent pressures such rationales.109
Formal rule changes may also hardwire into U.S. criminal law a
role for foreign ex ecutiv e branches, further bolstering U.S.
prosecutorial authority. Indeed, in such cases, criminal defendants
may confront the reality of facing not one ex ecutiv e prosecutorial
authority, but multiple. This “supercharged” ex ecutiv e effectiv ely
doubles down on common critiques regardingthe inequality of arms
in criminal prosecutions, giv en that coordination between nations may
minimize or ev en eliminate defendant v oice.
Specifically, foreign ex ecutiv e branches may fortify U.S. prosecutors in adv ocatingfor judicial resolution of questions of both fact and
law. Regarding the former, for ex ample, the Maritime Drug Law
Enforcement Act (MDLEA) prov ides that the Secretary of State may
“conclusiv ely” certify that a v essel engaged in drug-related activ ity is
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one “without nationality”—a threshold jurisdictional determination
that the defendant cannot challenge.110 In other words, in such
instances the U.S. ex ecutiv e branch has final authority to speak with
not one but two ex ecutiv e branch v oices, and that determination forecloses any judicial inquiry into the actual v eracity of the claim.111 As
the Elev enth Circuit has held, “any battle ov er the United States’
compliance with international law in obtaining MDLEA jurisdiction
should be resolv ed nation-to-nation in the international arena, not
between criminal defendants and the United States in the U.S. criminal justice system.”112 Regardingquestions of law, foreign ex ecutiv e
branches’ representations about their own law may become a basis for
conv iction in the United States. The Lacey Act, for ex ample, makes it
unlawful to trade in fish or wildlife taken “in v iolation of any foreign
law.”113 As noted by Dan Richman, Kate Stith, and Bill Stuntz, the
Lacey Act thus represents an ex ample of delegation of federal criminal lawmaking, and one that may similarly become hardwired into
U.S. criminal jurisprudence.114 The Elev enth Circuit has ev en upheld
the conv iction of defendants for v iolations of Honduran law after the
Honduran ex ecutiv e later changed its representations regarding its
law.115
B. From Slight to Extreme: Foreign Affairs Deference in Criminal
Cases

110
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46 U.S.C. § 70502 (2012).
See United States v . Hernandez, 864 F.3d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 2017) (“MDLEA
statelessness does not turn on actual statelessness, but rather on the response of the foreign
gov ernment. Arguingactual registry against the certification therefore misses the mark.”).
112 Id. at 1302.
113 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a)(2)(A) (2012).
114 RICHMAN, STITH & STUNTZ, supra note 18 (manuscript ch. 12, at 24–25).
115 See United States v . McNab, 331 F.3d 1228, 1241 (11th Cir. 2003) (“When . . . a
foreign gov ernment changes its original position regarding the v alidity of its laws after a
defendant has been conv icted, our courts are not required to rev ise their prior
determinations of foreign law solely upon the basis of the foreign gov ernment’s new
position.”); RICHMAN, STITH & STUNTZ, supra note 18 (manuscript ch. 12, at 25).
116 Whitman v . United States, 135 S. Ct. 352, 352 (2014) (Scalia, J., respectingdenial of
certiorari); see also Abramski v . United States, 134 S. Ct. 2259, 2274 (2014) (“The critical
point is that criminal laws are for courts, not for the Gov ernment, to construe.”); United
States v . Apel, 571 U.S. 359, 369 (2014) (“[W]e hav e nev er held that the Gov ernment’s
111
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The judiciary may also aggrandize ex ecutiv e authority in foreign
affairs prosecutions when it confers great deference on the ex ecutiv e
branch. As a formal matter, such deference in a classical criminal case
is highly unusual: The Supreme Court has consistently maintained that
“[a] court owes no deference to the prosecution’s interpretation of a
criminal law.”116 From a realist perspectiv e, of course, the ex ecutiv e’s
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ex tensiv e ex pertise regardinglaw enforcement capabilities and necessities does influence the judiciary in criminal cases.117 Nonetheless, as
a general rule, “the rule of lenity forbids deference to the ex ecutiv e
branch’s interpretation of a crime-creatinglaw.”118
In foreign affairs cases, by contrast, courts both ex plicitly and
implicitly defer to the ex ecutiv e regardingits conduct in foreign relations.119 Broadly speaking, these cases include ex ecutiv e foreign policy
judgments relatingto application of separation of powers rules, such
as the act of state doctrine;120 the political question doctrine, which
may inv olv e not only a justiciability determination but also judicial
acceptance of an ex ecutiv e determination of a legal issue as
binding;121 matters that fall within the ex ecutiv e’s ex clusiv e lawmaking authority;122 and the ex ecutiv e determination of “interna-

05/14/2019 08:58:42
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readingof a criminal statute is entitled to any deference.”); Crandon v . United States, 494
U.S. 152, 177 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The Justice Department, of course, has a v ery
specific responsibility to determine for itself what this statute means, in order to decide
when to prosecute; but we hav e nev er thought that the interpretation of those charged with
prosecutingcriminal statutes is entitled to deference.”).
117 This implicit deference in criminal law is under-recognized in the literature, ex cept
for some scholarship on the role of prosecutors’ charging decisions. See, e.g., Bennett L.
Gershman, A Moral Standard for the Prosecutor’s Exercise of the Charging Discretion, 20
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 513, 513 (1993) (“The judicial deference shown to prosecutors
generally is most noticeable with respect to the charging function.”); Bruce A. Green &
Samuel J. Lev ine, Disciplinary Regulation of Prosecutors as a Remedy for Abuses of
Prosecutorial Discretion: A Descriptive and Normative Analysis, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
143, 145 (2016) (“U.S. Supreme Court decisions and other case law establish that federal
judges presiding ov er criminal cases are generally required, for reasons relating to
constitutional separation of powers, to defer to prosecutors’ decisions about whether to
initiate or dismiss criminal charges.”); Daniel J. Solov e, The Darkest Domain: Deference,
Judicial Review, and the Bill of Rights, 84 IOWA L. REV. 941, 964 (1999) (“When rev iewing
prosecutorial decisions—such as selectiv e prosecution and claims for potential
discriminatory jury selection—courts again are highly deferential.”); see also Darryl K.
Brown, Judicial Power to Regulate Plea Bargaining, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1225, 1231
(2016) (ex plainingand challengingrationales for the lack of constitutional rev iew of plea
bargaining); see also Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come out Ahead: Speculations on
the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95, 149 (1974) (“[T]he architecture of the
legal system tends to confer interlockingadv antages on ov erlappinggroups whom we hav e
called the ‘hav es.’”).
118 Carter v . Welles-Bowen Realty, Inc., 736 F.3d 722, 730 (6th Cir. 2013) (“If an
ordinary criminal law contains an uncertainty, ev ery court would agree that it must resolv e
the uncertainty in the defendant’s fav or. No judge would think of deferring to the
Department of Justice.” (quotingCrandon, 494 U.S. at 178 (Scalia, J., concurring))).
119 See Curtis A. Bradley, Chev ron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649,
659–63 (2000) (describing ways that courts defer to the ex ecutiv e branch on foreign
relations questions); Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations
Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1230, 1238 (2007).
120 Jinks & Katyal, supra note 119, at 1236–37.
121 Id. at 1237.
122 Id.
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tional facts.”123 In cases implicating national security, courts may
apply foreign affairs deference to questions of statutory and treaty
interpretation.124 Justifications for such deference include “ex pertise,
speed, secrecy, flex ibility, error costs, and the nature of the subject
matter.”125
In other words, from a judicial deference perspectiv e, criminal
cases and foreign affairs cases could not be any further apart. Scholars
such as Bill Eskridge and Lauren Baer hav e located criminal and foreign affairs cases on opposite ex tremes of the “continuum of deference” in statutory interpretation, rev ealing the contrast between
judicial “anti-deference” in criminal cases and super-strongdeference
in foreign relations cases.126 On one end they place criminal cases,
characterized by “anti-deference”—in which the Court “inv okes a
presumption against the agency interpretation,” such as the rule of
lenity—and hav ingan agency win rate of 36.2%.127 On the other end,
Curtiss-Wright foreign affairs deference has an agency win rate of
100%.128 In treaty interpretation cases, furthermore, the judiciary con-

05/14/2019 08:58:42
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123 Id. at 1238. Scholarship on foreign affairs deference is v ast and this Article does not
interv ene directly into broader debates about the contours of such deference. See, e.g.,
Bradley, supra note 119, at 659–63 (adv ancing a typology of foreign affairs deference as
constituting political question deference, ex ecutiv e branch lawmaking deference,
international facts deference, persuasiv eness deference, and Chevron deference). Rather,
the emphasis here is on broad foreign affairs deference compared to criminal law “antideference.” See infra note 133.
124 Pearlstein, supra note 21, at 792–93 (“In statutory interpretation, the Court has
broadly construed legislativ e delegations of power to the President. . . . [I]n treaty
interpretation . . . the President’s record of prev ailingin the Supreme Court is lengthy and
. . . the President’s power to ‘make treaties’ may giv e the Court formal reasons to accede to
the President’s interpretiv e wishes.”).
125 Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law,
128 HARV. L. REV. 1897, 1935 (2015). Scott Sulliv an has also suggested that the ex ecutiv e
ex hibits greater flex ibility, accountability, and specialization in foreign affairs, whereas the
judiciary enjoys a greater long-term perspectiv e, div ersity, and promotion of uniformity.
Scott M. Sulliv an, Rethinking Treaty Interpretation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 777, 795–97 (2008).
126 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chev ron to Hamdan, 96 GEO.
L.J. 1083, 1098 (2008).
127 Id. at 1099.
128 Id. Intermediate deference includes consultativ e, Chevron, Beth Israel, Seminole
Rock, and Skidmore deference, which ranges from agency win rates of 73.5 to 90.9%. Id.;
see also Chev ron U.S.A., Inc. v . NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Beth Israel Hosp. v . NLRB,
437 U.S. 483 (1978); Bowles v . Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945); Skidmore
v . Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). As many scholars hav e recognized, the
characterization of ex ecutiv e power in Curtiss-Wright is problematic as a matter of history,
constitutional methodology, and political theory. See generally Robert D. Sloane,
Responses to the Ten Questions: 4. Is Curtiss-Wright’s Characterization of Executive Power
Correct? The Puzzling Persistence of Curtiss-Wright-Based Theories of Executive Power,
37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 5072, 5074–86 (2011). Nonetheless, “it continues to ex ert an
influence out of proportion to its legal merits.” Id. at 5073.
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fers “great weight” on the ex ecutiv e’s interpretation.129 Dav id
Bederman demonstrated that the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist
Courts deferred to ex ecutiv e branch treaty interpretations 83% of the
time,130 whereas Robert Chesney has shown this number to be 79% in
a sample from 1984 to 2005, drawingon both the Supreme Court and
lower federal courts.131 And Harlan Cohen has shown more recently
that the circuit courts defer to ex ecutiv e interpretations 88% of the
time.132 Indeed, “the single best predictor of interpretiv e outcomes in
American treaty cases” is judicial deference to the ex ecutiv e
branch.133
So what happens when these two conflicting deference regimes
ov erlap in a foreign affairs prosecution? Ex isting scholarship has
touched only lightly on this tension.134 As part of a broader rev iv al of
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129 Dav id J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41 UCLA L. REV.
953, 1016 (1994); see also Joshua Weiss, Essay, Defining Executive Deference in Treaty
Interpretation Cases, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1592, 1594–95 (2011) (“The ‘great weight’
standard has . . . arisen in a number of treaty interpretation cases and has become a canon
the Court frequently consults when grapplingwith treaty interpretations.”). U.S. courts are
somewhat unusual globally in their deference to the ex ecutiv e branch in treaty
interpretation. See Michael P. Van Alstine, The Role of Domestic Courts in Treaty
Enforcement: Summary and Conclusions, in THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN TREATY
ENFORCEMENT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 555, 592–93 (Dav id Sloss ed., 2009) [hereinafter
THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN TREATY ENFORCEMENT].
130 See Bederman, supra note 129, at 1015–16, 1015 n.422 (noting that the Court
deferred to the ex ecutiv e in nine out of ten treaty interpretation cases under Rehnquist, in
fiv e out of sev en cases under Warren, and in fiv e out of six cases under Burger). Bederman
rev iewed Rehnquist Court decisions through 1993. See id. at 975 n.108 (listingsignificant
treaty interpretation cases through 1993).
131 See Robert M. Chesney, Disaggregating Deference: The Judicial Power and Executive
Treaty Interpretations, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1723, 1754–55 (2007) (noting that federal courts
deferred to the ex ecutiv e in fifty-three out of six ty-sev en treaty interpretation cases).
132 Harlan Grant Cohen, The Death of Deference and the Domestication of Treaty Law,
2015 BYU L. REV. 1467, 1488–89. The Supreme Court also applied a zero-deference
standard in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. See Dav id Sloss, Judicial
Deference to Executive Branch Treaty Interpretations: A Historical Perspective, 62 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497, 505–22 (2007); see also Dav id Sloss, United States, in THE ROLE
OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN TREATY ENFORCEMENT, supra note 129, at 504, 525 (noting
Supreme Court use of a pre-World War II canon of liberal interpretation in fav or of priv ate
rights rather than deferringto the ex ecutiv e’s interpretation).
133 Bederman, supra note 129, at 1015. As at least one scholar has noted, “[T]he precise
nature [of the ‘great weight’ standard], its triggering conditions, and the obligations it
imposes on judges are far from clear.” Chesney, supra note 131, at 1733. U.S. courts ex hibit
a “schizophrenic attitude” toward treaty cases, at times rulingin a manner that promotes
“ex ecutiv e control ov er foreign affairs” and at other times promoting“treaty compliance
and . . . protection of priv ate rights.” Sloss, United States, supra note 132, at 553.
134 Michael Kagan has recently ex plored a similar question in immigration law, arguing
for a “liberty ex ception” to Chevron deference. See Chev ron’s Liberty Exception, 104
IOWA L. REV. 491, 495 (2019) (“Chevron deference is inappropriate when courts rev iew
the legality of a gov ernment intrusion on physical liberty.”). He notes that Chief Justice
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foreign affairs deference scholarship in the wake of 9/11,135 some foreign relations scholars are recognizing that such deference is arising
outside of the national security contex t.136 For ex ample, in response to
a proposal that courts should giv e Chevron deference to the ex ecutiv e
branch’s interpretation of statutes with foreign relations implications,
Derek Jinks and Neal Katyal argued that this would lead to ex ecutiv e
ex pansionism giv en the rise in foreign relations cases.137 In illustrating
the point that foreign elements—such as foreign parties, questions of
foreign or international law, or some foreign conduct relev ant to the
litigation—are increasingly common in U.S. litigation, they referenced
criminal cases.138
In some respects, judicial decisionmakingin foreign affairs prosecutions resembles that in classical criminal cases. Courts are conscious
of defendant rights, inv okingmany of the fundamental concerns about
liberty interests that arise in classical criminal cases. For ex ample, the
rule of lenity may be inv oked to construe an ambiguous statute in
fav or of the defendant in cases where the statute arguably encompasses ex traterritorial conduct.139 Courts are also identifyingconstitutional constraints, including the ex traterritorial reach of the
Constitution and its role in protectingindiv idual rights and deterring
law enforcement, as well as the constitutional authority of Congress to
legislate in this criminal space.140 For ex ample, courts are increasingly
focusing on whether Congress may rely on the Offenses Clause and
Foreign Commerce Clause to criminalize certain ex traterritorial crim-
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Roberts and Justice Gorsuch may share in Justice Breyer’s “contex t-specific” approach to
deference. Id. at 505–07.
135 See, e.g., Pearlstein, supra note 21, at 785–87 (notingthe discussion amongst scholars
regarding deference in foreign relations law following certain post-9/11 Supreme Court
decisions); Posner & Sunstein, supra note 21, at 1204–07 (adv ancing a proposal for
Chevron deference in foreign relations cases); Jinks & Katyal, supra note 119, at 1233
(arguingagainst the Posner/Sunstein proposal and highlightingdeference’s importance in
the wake of 9/11); see also Abebe, supra note 21, at 125–27 (suggesting that American
unipolar hegemony may be contributing to lower lev els of judicial deference to the
ex ecutiv e).
136 See, e.g., Jinks & Katyal, supra note 119, at 1258 (discussing recent dev elopments
that hav e increased the number of cases to which foreign affairs deference applies).
137 See id. at 1258–60.
138 See id. at 1258 (“One problem is that deference triggered by foreign relations
‘effects’ arguably applies to any case containing a foreign relations component . . . . An
ordinary criminal prosecution . . . may affect foreign relations . . . and the ex ecutiv e might
well adv ance a broad interpretation of the statute. . . . .”).
139 See O’Sulliv an, supra note 14, at 1091 (“Where there is ambiguity regarding
[ex traterritoriality], the rule of lenity requires that it be resolv ed in the defendant’s fav or—
that is, the statute should not be applied ex traterritorially.”).
140 See, e.g., United States v . Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (considering
application of the Fourth Amendment to ex traterritorial searches).
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inal conduct.141 Courts may also weigh congressional intent, especially
in regard to the policy rationales that hav e encouraged Congress to
amend and enact certain statutes. For ex ample, the Comprehensiv e
Crime Control Act of 1984, which introduced the abov e-referenced
option of tolling the statute of limitations in cases of mutual legal
assistance, represents an instance of Congress dev iating from customary criminal process in order to facilitate transnational law
enforcement realities.142 Finally, courts may consider doctrinal distinctiv eness—resolv ing cases because of material differences between
criminal law and civ il law doctrine—and, from a realist perspectiv e,
perpetrator punishment—persuading courts through the perceiv ed
equities of ensuringaccountability to punish indiv iduals who hav e perpetrated horrific crimes against the public interest.143
Crucially, howev er, foreign affairs prosecutions are unique in one
central aspect: The issue of engagement with other nations arises frequently. In such instances, courts look to the ex ecutiv e’s unique role
as a branch of the federal gov ernment that is “dual-hatted”—both initiatingcriminal proceedings and conductingforeign affairs. In contrast
to priv ate plaintiffs, who are easier to dismiss when they are perceiv ed
as “foreigners” usingU.S. federal courts to resolv e foreign disputes,144
the ex ecutiv e branch enjoys the perception of inherent legitimacy in
federal prosecution.145 In foreign affairs prosecutions, a secondary
authority bolsters its influence: The ex ecutiv e can argue that it has
already considered the foreign affairs implications of a particular pros-
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141 See, e.g., United States v . Baston, 818 F.3d 651, 668 (11th Cir. 2016) (considering
congressional power under the Foreign Commerce Clause); United States v . BellaizacHurtado, 700 F.3d 1245, 1251 (11th Cir. 2012) (equating “law of nations” under the
Offenses Clause with “customary international law”); United States v . Clark, 435 F.3d
1100, 1114–17 (9th Cir. 2006) (considering congressional power under the Foreign
Commerce Clause).
142 See 18 U.S.C. § 3292 (2012).
143 See, e.g., United States v . Leija-Sanchez, 820 F.3d 899, 901 (7th Cir. 2016)
(distinguishing the application of the presumption against ex traterritorial application to
civ il statutes from its application to criminal cases); see also United States v . Alv arezMachain, 504 U.S. 655, 686 (1992) (Stev ens, J., dissenting) (recognizingthat the ex ecutiv e
is interested in punishing the respondent due to the brutal nature of the murder
committed). Howev er, in Justice Stev ens’s v iew, the ex ecutiv e’s desire to punish the
criminal perpetrator “prov ides no justification for disregardingthe Rule of Law that this
Court has a duty to uphold.” Id. at 686.
144 Justice Stev ens has referred to such cases as “foreign-cubed”: when foreign plaintiffs
sue foreign defendants ov er conduct occurring in foreign countries in U.S. courts for
alleged v iolations of U.S. law. Morrison v . Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 283 n.11
(2010) (Stev ens, J., concurringin the judgment).
145 See Sklansky, Prosecutorial Power, supra note 12, at 498–510 (discussing factors
contributingto prosecutorial discretion and legitimacy).
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ecution146 giv en it is in the best position to weigh international
comity147 and has more mechanisms at its disposal to reduce foreign
conflicts in criminal cases.148 This claim that deference is owed to the
dual-hatted ex ecutiv e—deriv ingfrom the limits of the judiciary’s competence regardinginternational affairs—resembles foreign affairs deference. And such deference may be giv en to the gov ernment at
v arious stages throughout a criminal case, meaningthe foreign affairs
considerations cumulativ ely begin to ov erwhelm customary criminal
process.149
To some degree such prosecutorial authority is unsurprising.
Dav id Sklansky has recently adv anced a conception of prosecutors as
“mediating” figures who bridge organizational and theoretical div ides
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146 The concern regardingov er-inv olv ement in foreign affairs has less purchase in cases
implicatingfederal law, giv en that the federal gov ernment has power ov er foreign affairs.
See Farbiarz, supra note 16, at 526. Federal criminal law only underscores this distinction,
giv en that the ex ecutiv e branch—as opposed to priv ate litigants—is the one initiating
criminal prosecutions. Id. at 526–27. Ev en in state prosecutions, the federal ex ecutiv e
branch increasingly cooperates with state ex ecutiv e branch actors to facilitate their
prosecutions with transnational aspects. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL § 915.210, https://www.justice.gov /jm/jm-9-15000-international-ex tradition-and-relatedmatters#9-15.210 (last updated Apr. 2018) (“The Criminal Div ision’s Office of
International Affairs (OIA) prov ides information and adv ice to [f]ederal and [s]tate
prosecutors about the procedure for requesting ex tradition from abroad.”). In practice,
OIA functions as a clearing house for transnational criminal questions outside of the
ex tradition contex t.
147 Clopton, Bowman Lives, supra note 14, at 192.
148 These av ailable mechanisms include bilateral and multilateral treaties that prov ide
for the ex change of indictees and incarcerated conv icts. See, e.g., Conv ention on the
Transfer of Sentenced Persons, Mar. 21, 1983, 35 U.S.T. 2867 (creatingrules that gov ern
the relationship between the sentencing State and the administering State to facilitate
cooperation in the transfer of sentenced persons).
149 A recent ex ample of this, albeit in the civ il contex t, is Animal Science Products v.
Hebei Welcome Pharmaceutical Co., 138 S. Ct. 1865 (2018). Faced with the question of the
degree of deference a court is required to giv e to foreign gov ernments’ amicus submissions
in U.S. courts, the Supreme Court rejected the v arious standards the courts of appeals had
applied in prev ious cases, instead adoptingthe “respectful consideration” standard which
the United States had proposed in its amicus brief. See id. at 1869; Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae SupportingPetitioners at 17–21, Animal Science Products, 138 S.
Ct. 1865 (No. 16-1220), 2018 WL 1181858. By doingso, the Court articulated a standard far
less deferential than those the courts of appeals had adopted. See, e.g., Andreas L. Paulus,
From Neglect to Defiance? The United States and International Adjudication, 15 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 783, 804 (2004) (describingthe respectful consideration standard as an “ex ercise in
inconsequential politeness”); see also Daniel Fahrenthold, Note, Navigating “Respectful
Consideration”: Foreign Sovereign Amici in U.S. Courts, 119 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming
2019) (on file with New York Univ ersity Law Rev iew). But ev en as it eliminated deference
to foreign gov ernments, the Court emphasized the almost conclusiv e deference the federal
gov ernment is owed when it participates directly in the process of obtaining a foreign
gov ernment’s position on the litigation, effectiv ely reallocating any international comity
inquiry from the courts back to the federal gov ernment. Animal Science Products, 138 S.
Ct. at 1874–75 (citingUnited States v . Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 218 (1942)).
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1. Treaty Interpretation
In foreign affairs prosecutions, the “great weight”153 that the judiciary confers on ex ecutiv e interpretations of treaties may undermine
defendant interests. As will be seen below, in such cases a defendant’s
position may resemble that of a third-party beneficiary, asserting
rights under a criminal treaty that ex ists between the United States
and another sov ereign. Often, howev er, the U.S. prosecutor will
inv oke the legal position of that sov ereign as additional authority
when arguingfor a contrary interpretation of the treaty. The judiciary
151
152
153

Sklansky, Prosecutorial Power, supra note 12, at 477.
Id.
Eskridge & Baer, supra note 126, at 1101 (emphasis omitted).
See supra note 129 and accompanyingtex t.
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in criminal justice.150 In Sklansky’s v iew, prosecutors stand in a
“boundary-blurring” space between adv ersarial and inquisitorial justice, between the police and the courts, and between law and discretion.151 In foreign affairs prosecutions, prosecutors are increasingly
playing another mediating function: between the United States and
foreign sov ereigns. They are frequently called upon to act as representativ es of foreign interests within the U.S. criminal justice system.
They are also ex pected to work with foreign counterparts in order to
adv ance joint inv estigations. And finally, they are ex pected to make
such dev elopments intelligible to Congress when adv ocatingfor relev ant statutory reforms.
Three points bear emphasis. First, this is an emergingdeference
trend in foreign affairs prosecutions; thus, the rest of Section II.B
shows illustrativ e cases that represent this trend and foreshadow the
potential risk to indiv idual rights that such cases represent. Second,
the cases below are by no means a comprehensiv e rev iew of all
instances in which this deference arises; a wide v ariety of doctrinal
areas manifest the challenges the judiciary has faced in this regard.
And third, whereas deference regimes like Chevron are inv oked
ex plicitly through citation to the case itself, “it remains a rarity for the
Court to announce super-strongdeference” of the kind seen in foreign
affairs cases.152 It is similarly rare for courts to announce such deference in foreign affairs prosecutions. Yet this heightened judicial deference is v isible through sev eral windows, considered in the rest of
Section II.B: (1) differences between foreign affairs prosecutions and
analogous classical criminal prosecutions; (2) dissentingopinions critiquing the reasoning of the majority on this ground; (3) circuit court
splits; and (4) academic critiques of courts’ rulings.
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will then confer heightened deference on the ex ecutiv e branch’s
interpretation.
Let us return in greater depth to United States v. AlvarezMachain,154 a foreign affairs prosecution inv olv ing ex traterritorial
criminal conduct and—crucially for this particular case—foreign
apprehension.155 Siding with the gov ernment’s interpretation of the
ex tradition treaty,156 the majority held that the respondent’s abduction was not a v iolation of the U.S.-Mex ico ex tradition treaty, and
thus the long-standing Ker-Frisbie doctrine applied.157 Under KerFrisbie, a defendant’s abduction does not prohibit his trial in U.S.
court for v iolations of U.S. criminal law.158 The majority acknowledged that the “shocking” abduction might be considered a v iolation
of general international law principles and further noted Mex ico’s
ex plicit and activ e diplomatic protests.159 But it ultimately av oided the
question by statingthat the prospectiv e return of Alv arez-Machain to
Mex ico was “as a matter outside of the Treaty” and thus for the ex ecutiv e branch to decide.160
The majority was wrong in its reasoning; the v ery nature of a
bilateral ex tradition treaty, with precise procedures and criteria for
mov ing fugitiv es across borders, demands a contrary interpretation.
The canon of good faith in treaty interpretation—which emphasizes
consistency of interpretation with treaty partners—dictates this
result.161 Not only the dissent but also legal scholars and gov ernments
worldwide hav e underscored this point.162
154

504 U.S. 655 (1992).
Id. at 657. DEA agents were found to hav e been responsible for the abduction,
though were not personally inv olv ed. Id. The Respondent was flown to Tex as whereupon
he was arrested by DEA in connection with the kidnap and murder of a DEA agent in
Mex ico. Id.
156 Brief for the United States at 21–23, Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (No. 91-712)
(arguingthat the ex tradition treaty did not prohibit ex traterritorial apprehension).
157 Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 669–70.
158 Id. at 670.
159 Id. at 669.
160 Id.
161 As Michael Van Alstine has noted, the Court no longer ex plicitly applies the canon
of good faith, which has led to a “rudderless drift in treaty interpretation” and confusion in
the lower courts. Michael P. Van Alstine, The Death of Good Faith in Treaty Jurisprudence
and a Call for Resurrection, 93 GEO. L.J. 1885, 1887 (2005). Howev er, courts may still
implicitly apply the canon. Sloss, United States, supra note 132, at 523. In this case such
application would hav e led to proper interpretation of the U.S.-Mex ico ex tradition treaty.
162 Reasoning from the ex tradition treaty’s structure, purpose, and prov isions, Justice
Stev ens—joined by Justices Blackmun and O’Connor—concluded that the treaty was a
“comprehensiv e document” and one that should protect defendants from prosecution in
cases of forcible abduction circumv enting the ex tradition process. Alvarez-Machain, 504
U.S. at 671–75 (Stev ens, J., dissenting). The dissent also considered the U.S. gov ernment’s
inv olv ement in Alv arez-Machain’s kidnappingto be a “flagrant v iolation of international
155

41254-nyu_94-3 Sheet No. 32 Side A
05/14/2019 08:58:42

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3398955

41254-nyu_94-3 Sheet No. 32 Side B

05/14/2019 08:58:42

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\94-3\NYU302.tx t

374

unknown

Seq: 35

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

13-MAY-19

12:33

[Vol. 94:340

Why such a mistake? While some scholars hav e identified doctrinal reasons, such as the structure of the treaty or the nature of customary international law,163 both the dissent and subsequent
scholarship hav e pointed to undue judicial deference to the ex ecutiv e’s interpretation of the treaty.164 Here, the ex ecutiv e branch
argued for what it perceiv ed to be the meaningof the treaty and thus,
implicitly, the U.S. gov ernment’s belief about the shared intent of the
two state parties. Or, put another way, the ex ecutiv e branch effectiv ely stood as a prox y for Mex ico in the U.S. courts, thus adv ocating
with greater persuasiv e authority and minimizing Alv arez-Machain’s
ability to assert rights under the treaty.165 This opened the door to
prosecutorial interests obscuring good faith treaty interpretation: As
the dissent reasoned, the majority reached its outcome by deferringto
“the Ex ecutiv e’s intense interest in punishing respondent in our
courts” for the brutal murder of a U.S. law enforcement agent.166
Another ex ample of this dynamic is Sanchez-Llamas v.
Oregon,167 a foreign affairs prosecution inv olv ing Mex ican and
Honduran defendants and both countries’ consular officials. Under
the Vienna Conv ention on Consular Relations (VCCR) Article 36,
indiv iduals detained in a foreign country hav e a right to hav e their
consulate notified of their detainment; further, the article requires
that arresting“authorities shall inform the person concerned without
delay of his rights.”168 In Sanchez-Llamas, neither defendant was
informed of his Article 36 rights upon arrest; subsequently, one made
incriminatingstatements to the police and was conv icted of attempted
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law” and breach of treaty obligations. Id. at 682. For their part, commentators and national
gov ernments worldwide condemned the decision. See supra note 2.
163 See, e.g., Glennon, supra note 2, at 747.
164 After analyzing the treaty and international law norms more generally, the dissent
focused on the majority’s wholesale acceptance of the ex ecutiv e’s one-sided treaty
interpretation, stating“[t]hat the Ex ecutiv e[’s] . . . wish to reinterpret the Treaty to allow
for an action that the Treaty in no way authorizes should not influence [sic] this Court’s
interpretation.”Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 686–87 (Stev ens, J., dissenting). Eskridge and
Baer hav e noted that the Court instead implicitly accorded foreign affairs deference to the
ex ecutiv e, part of a larger trend of cases where the Court “goes along with legally weak
ex ecutiv e department arguments in cases inv olv ing foreign affairs or national security.”
Eskridge & Baer, supra note 126, at 1102.
165 In fact, the ex ecutiv e branch’s representation regardingthe intent of the two parties
differed from that of the gov ernment of Mex ico, which protested the abduction and
interpretation of the treaty that the ex ecutiv e branch espoused. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S.
at 669.
166 Id. at 686 (Stev ens, J., dissenting). In the dissent’s v iew, the ex ecutiv e’s desire to
punish the criminal perpetrator “prov ide[d] no justification for disregarding the Rule of
Law that this Court has a duty to uphold.” Id.
167 548 U.S. 331 (2006).
168 Vienna Conv ention on Consular Relations, supra note 35, art. 36(1)(b).
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Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 340–41.
Id. at 337. The other issues were whether it was permissible for a state to treat a
defendant’s claim as defaulted for failure to raise at trial and whether suppression of
ev idence is a proper remedy for a v iolation of Article 36. Id. The Court concluded that,
simply on the basis of non-notification, suppression is not appropriate, and ordinary rules
of procedural default apply. Id.
171 Id. at 343 (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 11, Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. 331 (No. 05-51, 04-10566)).
172 Id. (“Because we conclude that Sanchez-Llamas and Bustillo are not in any ev ent
entitled to relief on their claims, we find it unnecessary to resolv e the question whether the
Vienna Conv ention grants indiv iduals enforceable rights.”). Justice Breyer, writing in
dissent, would hav e affirmativ ely decided the question. Id. at 371, 378 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
173 While Justice Ginsburgconcurred in the judgment, she agreed that Article 36 grants
rights that defendants may inv oke in a judicial proceeding. Id. at 360 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring).
174 Id. at 378 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
175 Id. (quotingSumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v . Av agliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184–85 (1982)).
170
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murder while the other was conv icted of first-degree murder.169 One
of the issues before the Court was whether VCCR Article 36
“create[s] rights that defendants may inv oke against the detaining
authorities in a criminal trial or in a post-conv iction proceeding,” and,
if so, what remedy was appropriate to redress v iolations of such
rights.170
Sanchez-Llamas represents another ex ample of the Court deferringto ex ecutiv e inv ocation of foreign interests in foreign affairs prosecutions. In arguingagainst the enforceability of Article 36 rights, the
gov ernment as amicus curiae argued that “political and diplomatic
channels, rather than . . . the courts” were the presumptiv e forums for
treaty enforcement.171 The Court found it unnecessary to resolv e that
question, howev er, concludingthat neither defendant was entitled to
relief on their claims.172 In dissent, Justice Breyer—joined by Justices
Stev ens and Souter, as well as Justice Ginsburgin relev ant part173—
disagreed, reasoning that Article 36 created indiv idually-enforceable
rights because the language, nature of the right, and the interpretation
of an international court “so strongly point to an intent to confer”
such rights.174 Justice Breyer emphasized that, while “the Ex ecutiv e
Branch’s interpretation of treaty prov isions is entitled to ‘great
weight,’ ” such determinations were “not conclusiv e,” and “the simple
fact of the Ex ecutiv e Branch’s contrary v iew” was insufficient reason
to adopt the gov ernment’s interpretation of Article 36.175
As in Alvarez-Machain, the plain language, object, and purpose
of the treaty were clear: to ensure criminal defendants’ access to consular officials. And this surely creates indiv idually enforceable rights;
as Justice Breyer correctly noted, if a pre-Miranda federal statute had
prov ided that law enforcement “shall inform a detained person
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without delay of his right to counsel,” courts would surely affirm that
this statute created rights that criminal defendants could inv oke at
trial.176 And yet, again, the judiciary conferred implicit deference on
the ex ecutiv e’s interpretation and undermined defendant interests by
asserting that such matters should be resolv ed through diplomatic
channels.
As a final ex ample, rule-of-specialty cases demonstrate how
div ergent judicial conceptions of defendant rights under treaties lead
to circuit splits in the lower courts. Such div ergence turns on which
party—the prosecutor or the defendant—the court perceiv es to be the
prox y for foreign interests. The recurring issue in these cases is
whether an ex tradited defendant has standingto raise v iolations of the
rule of specialty under a bilateral ex tradition treaty. The rule of specialty is a widely accepted principle of international ex tradition law
whereby the requesting state must limit its prosecution of an ex tradited indiv idual to the offense(s) specified in the ex tradition agreement.177 Many U.S. bilateral ex tradition treaties include ex plicit
specialty prov isions,178 and the principle has been reflected in statutory form since the mid-nineteenth century.179
The question of whether a criminal defendant has standing to
raise a v iolation of specialty has div ided the circuits, with some reasoningthat defendants may stand in the place of another sov ereign to
assert rule-of-specialty arguments.180 Among those circuits that hav e
definitiv ely addressed standing, the Third, Six th, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth,
and Elev enth Circuits hav e all held that a defendant has standingto
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Id. at 374.
BASSIOUNI, supra note 45, at 538; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 477(1)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (“A person
who has been ex tradited to another state will not, unless the requested state consents, be
tried by the requestingstate for an offense other than one for which he was ex tradited.”).
The surrenderingstate may also place limitations on the penalties to be imposed for those
crimes, which must be adhered to by the requestingstate. BASSIOUNI, supra note 45, at 538.
178 See, e.g., Ex tradition Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic
of Korea, S. Kor.-U.S., art. 15, June 9, 1998, T.I.A.S. No. 12,962.
179 See 18 U.S.C. § 3186 (2012) (based on 18 U.S.C. § 653 (1940)) (authorizing the
Secretary of State to order certain fugitiv es remitted to foreign gov ernments pursuant to
treaty); id. § 3192 (based on 18 U.S.C. § 659 (1940)) (empoweringthe President to protect
persons ex tradited to the United States, though not touchingon the jurisdiction of courts);
United States v . Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 423–24 (1886) (interpreting U.S. treaties of
ex tradition to include the rule of specialty, in light of two U.S. statutes).
180 In all circuits, defendant standingis deriv ativ e of another nation’s specialty claims; a
defendant’s standingis contingent on the country not waiv ingor otherwise disclaimingthe
rule. See, e.g., United States v . Puentes, 50 F.3d 1567, 1574 (11th Cir. 1995) (“The
ex tradited indiv idual’s rights . . . need not be cast in stone; rather, the indiv idual may enjoy
these protections only at the sufferance of the requested nation. The indiv idual’s rights are
deriv ativ e of the rights of the requested nation.”).
177
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raise a v iolation of the rule of specialty to the ex tent the surrendering
country could hav e objected.181 For ex ample, in United States v.
Thirion,182 the Eighth Circuit permitted the defendant to “raise
whatev er objections to his prosecution that Monaco might hav e,”
giv en that Monaco had not consented to his ex tradition on a conspiracy count not enumerated as an offense under the U.S.-Monaco
ex tradition treaty.183 Similarly, in United States v. Cuevas, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed that “[a] person ex tradited may raise whatev er objections the ex traditingcountry would hav e been entitled to raise.”184
In contrast, the Second and Sev enth Circuits hav e relied on prosecutors as the prox ies for a foreign nation in rule of specialty disputes,
finding that defendants lack standing to challenge v iolations of specialty unless there is an affirmativ e protest from the surrendering
country.185 In such cases, an ex ecutiv e-ex ecutiv e relationship again
“supercharges” the persuasiv e power of U.S. prosecutors, thus influencingcourts at the ex pense of defendant interests. Take for ex ample
the 2017 case United States v. Barinas, where the defendant sought to
raise a specialty challenge to the court’s findingof a superv ised release
v iolation when he was ex tradited for offenses committed while he was
subject to a release condition not to commit any further federal or
state crimes for fiv e years.186 Reasoningthat treaties are “primarily a
compact between independent nations,” the court held that the defendant lacked standing giv en that the Dominican Republic had not
objected, nor was there indication in the treaty of an intent to make its
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181 United States v . Fontana, 869 F.3d 464, 469 (6th Cir. 2017) (“We . . . hold that an
indiv idual ex tradited pursuant to an ex tradition treaty has standingunder the doctrine of
specialty to raise any objections which the requested nation might hav e asserted.”); United
States v . Lomeli, 596 F.3d 496, 500 (8th Cir. 2010) (notingthat ex tradited defendants may
allege treaty v iolations that the renderingcountry would hav e raised); Puentes, 50 F.3d at
1572 (holdingthat the defendant had standingto allege treaty v iolations that the rendering
country would hav e alleged); United States v . Riv iere, 924 F.2d 1289, 1297 (3d Cir. 1991)
(finding that Dominica’s waiv er of objection to the defendant’s trial eliminated the
defendant’s rights under the treaty); United States v . Lev y, 905 F.2d 326, 328 n.1 (10th Cir.
1990) (rejectingthe gov ernment’s challenge to the defendant’s standing); United States v .
Cuev as, 847 F.2d 1417, 1426 (9th Cir. 1988) (determining the scope of permissible
objections for the defendant to raise by ex amining the Swiss court’s restrictions on the
ex tradition order).
182 813 F.2d 146 (8th Cir. 1987).
183 Id. at 151 (citingRauscher, 119 U.S. at 419); see also Lomeli, 596 F.3d at 500 (“This
circuit has held that ex tradited indiv iduals such as Lomeli hav e standing to raise any
objection that the surrenderingcountry might hav e raised to their prosecution.”).
184 Cuevas, 847 F.2d at 1426.
185 See, e.g., United States v . Barinas, 865 F.3d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 2017) (rejecting
defendant’s standing because the Dominican Republic did not object to the proceedings
brought against the defendant).
186 Id. at 100–01.
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prov isions enforceable by indiv idual defendants.187 Likewise, precedent from the Sev enth Circuit indicates that defendants lack standing
to raise specialty absent sov ereign protest. The general principle arose
in Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, which concerned a habeas petition by
a defendant who had been arrested in Honduras by U.S. agents and
the Honduran military and flown to the United States.188 The defendant argued “that his arrest v iolate[d] international law, namely . . .
two ex tradition treaties to which the United States and Honduras
were parties.”189 Howev er, the court found that—in light of the fact
that treaties are designed to protect nations’ sov ereign interests—
Matta-Ballesteros lacked standing to allege a treaty v iolation absent
Honduran protest.190
In sum, foreign affairs prosecutions often inv olv e defendants in a
position of third-party beneficiary, assertingrights under a treaty that
the United States and one or more other nations hav e ratified. In such
cases, foreign affairs authority bolsters the ex ecutiv e branch, which
stands in for the interests of the other sov ereign. Giv en this fortified
ex ecutiv e role, the judiciary often defers to the ex ecutiv e branch, typically in a manner adv erse to defendant interests.
2. Statutory Interpretation

187
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Id. at 104–05 (quotingMora v . New York, 524 F.3d 183, 200 (2d Cir. 2008)).
896 F.2d 255, 256 (7th Cir. 1990).
189 Id. at 259.
190 Id. Notably, Matta-Ballesteros did not raise a specialty challenge, nor did the court
discuss Rauscher. See id. In United States v. Munoz-Solarte, the court cited MattaBallesteros for its conclusion that the defendant lacked standingto challenge specialty, and
that it could not conclude the surrenderingstate objected absent an official protest. United
States v . Munoz-Solarte, Nos. 93-2723 & 93-3811, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 18128, at *5–6
(7th Cir. July 18, 1994). The court addressed specialty in a similarly abbrev iated fashion in
United States v. Burke, in which the defendant argued that his prosecution for perjury
(which had occurred after his ex tradition) v iolated the rule of specialty. 425 F.3d 400, 407
(7th Cir. 2005). Citing Matta-Ballesteros and the United Kingdom’s lack of protest, in
addition to the fact that the crime occurred after the ex tradition, the court emphasized the
role of treaties in regulatingrelations between sov ereigns when denyingstanding. Burke,
425 F.3d at 408.
188
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When interpretingfederal statutes in foreign affairs prosecutions,
courts may also defer to the ex ecutiv e in a manner that pressures
defendant interests. Although no treaty is at issue, the dual-hatted
ex ecutiv e may still represent foreign interests to the court, triggering
heightened judicial deference adv erse to defendants. Crucially, this
dynamic may play out in foreign affairs prosecutions regardless of
whether a court classifies the underlyingcriminal statute as “ex traterritorial” or “territorial.”
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Take, for ex ample, cases construingcriminal statutes’ ex traterritoriality. When a case inv olv es a potential ex traterritorial application
of a U.S. statute, courts now apply the two-step framework first
articulated in Morrison v. National Australia Bank, Ltd.191 This new
test, raisingthe bar for ov ercomingthe presumption against ex traterritoriality, has been reaffirmed and applied recently in Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum 192 and RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European
Community.193
One might think that criminal cases would hav e the same or ev en
higher ex traterritorial threshold: Criminal law turns on specificity and
congressional direction much more than civ il law.194 And yet many
courts are still upholdingconv ictions that would likely be ov erturned
under the Morrison test by applying United States v. Bowman,195 a
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191 561 U.S. 247 (2010). Under this new two-step framework, the Court looks first to see
whether the statute contains a “clear, affirmativ e indication” that rebuts the presumption
against ex traterritoriality. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v . European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2101
(2016). Second, if the statute is not ex traterritorial, the Court will consider the statute’s
“focus”: If the conduct relev ant to the statute’s focus occurred within U.S. territory, then
domestic application is permissible in the case, regardless of whether other conduct
occurred abroad; but if the conduct relev ant to the focus occurred outside of U.S. territory,
ex traterritorial application is impermissible, ev en if other conduct occurred domestically.
Id. If, alternativ ely, the statute is ex traterritorial, then the Court will consider
congressional limits on the statute’s foreign application, not the statute’s focus. Id.
192 569 U.S. 108, 116, 124 (2013) (applyingthe two-step framework and determiningthat
the Alien Tort Statute does not rebut the presumption against ex traterritoriality).
193 136 S. Ct. at 2101 (applyingthe two-step framework to the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act and findingthe presumption against ex traterritoriality rebutted
in certain applications).
194 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 403 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (“[L]egislativ e intent to subject conduct outside the
state’s territory to its criminal law should be found only on the basis of ex press statement
or clear implication.”). Separation-of-power and legality principles are stronger in criminal
than in civ il cases. See O’Sulliv an, supra note 14, at 1089.
195 See, e.g., United States v . Weingarten, 632 F.3d 60, 66–67 (2d Cir. 2011) (findingthat
the presumption against ex traterritoriality does not apply because, under the Bowman test,
“it is reasonable to conclude that Congress intended to proscribe . . . [the crimes of
trav eling in foreign commerce to engage in illicit sex ual relations with minors and
conspiracy to do so] when hatched abroad, lest the effectiv eness of the statute be
threatened”); United States v . Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 813 (11th Cir. 2010) (“We hav e
interpreted Bowman to hold that ex traterritorial application may be inferred from the
nature of the offense and Congress’s other legislativ e efforts to eliminate the type of crime
inv olv ed.” (quotingUnited States v . Frank, 599 F.3d 1221, 1230 (11th Cir. 2010))); United
States v . Harder, 168 F. Supp. 3d 732, 744 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (rejecting the defendant’s
argument that Morrison and Kiobel apply to the Trav el Act); United States v . Carson, No.
SACR 09-00077-JVS, 2011 WL 7416975, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011) (“Ev en if an
ex traterritorial analysis is implicated here, the Trav el Act counts are proper under
Bowman . . . .”); United States v . Campbell, 798 F. Supp. 2d 293, 304 (D.D.C. July 27, 2011)
(“[T]he purpose of § 666 [solicitation of a bribe by an agent of an organization receiv ing
more than $10,000 in federal funds] parallels that of the statute considered by the Supreme
Court in Bowman and falls squarely within Bowman’s holding.”); see also United States v .
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1922 Supreme Court case holdingthat ex traterritoriality may be read
into a criminal statute if a strictly territorial readingwould “greatly . . .
curtail the scope and usefulness of the statute.”196 The ex ecutiv e’s
assertion of foreign interests also marks these cases, triggeringgreater
judicial deference to the ex ecutiv e’s competence in managinginternational friction. For ex ample, the Sev enth Circuit has twice held that 18
U.S.C. § 1959 (v iolent crimes in aid of racketeering activ ity) applies
ex traterritorially because, inter alia, crimes such as murder inherently
present fewer foreign law conflicts than civ il laws do.197 It also reasoned that “[a]ny international repercussions of the decision to prosecute Leija-Sanchez are for the political branches to resolv e with their
counterparts in Mex ico” and that in the present case the Mex ican gov ernment’s ex tradition of the defendant to the United States suggested
its consent to the U.S. prosecution for murder.198 In reaffirming its
holdingpost-Morrison, the court emphasized that Bowman’s “holding
that criminal and civ il laws differ with respect to ex traterritorial application . . . is not affected by yet another decision [(Morrison)] showing
how things work on the civ il side.”199
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Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922); Clopton, Bowman Lives, supra note 14, at 138–39 (noting
that the presumption against ex traterritoriality articulated by the Supreme Court in civ il
cases has not been ex tended to the criminal contex t, where courts rely on Bowman to
uphold the ex traterritorial application of criminal laws); cf. United States v . Sidorenko, 102
F. Supp. 3d 1124, 1129, 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (recognizingthat Bowman may be good law
post-Morrison but declining to find ex traterritorial application of federal wire fraud and
bribery statutes).
196 Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98.
197 See United States v . Leija-Sanchez, 820 F.3d 899, 901 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Morrison
does not undermine our 2010 decision. It does not mention either Bowman or § 1959. A
decision such as Bowman, holding that criminal and civ il laws differ with respect to
ex traterritorial application, is not affected by yet another decision showing how things
work on the civ il side.”); United States v . Leija-Sanchez, 602 F.3d 797, 799 (7th Cir. 2010)
(Easterbrook, C.J.) (“Nations differ in the way they treat the role of religion in
employment [(as in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991))]; they do not
differ to the same ex tent in the way they treat murder.”); see also Clopton, Bowman Lives,
supra note 14, at 192 (“[A]t least one court was persuaded by the intuitiv e position that
U.S. criminal law presents fewer or less significant conflicts with foreign laws than U.S.
civ il law presents.”).
198 Leija-Sanchez, 602 F.3d at 801 (“That diplomacy has occurred already. Three of
Leija-Sanchez’s co-defendants were apprehended in Mex ico, which agreed to ex tradite
them to the United States to face all of the indictment’s substantiv e charges, including
arrangingfor Montes’s murder.”).
199 Leija-Sanchez, 820 F.3d at 901. Julie O’Sulliv an has recently noted that “[d]espite the
modern Supreme Court’s strongpresumption against ex traterritoriality, it is relativ ely rare
for courts of appeals to find that a federal criminal statute does not hav e ex traterritorial
purchase.” O’Sulliv an, supra note 14, at 1027; see also Verdier, supra note 18, at 24
(askingwhether Bowman remains v iable precedent and notingthat lower courts hav e gone
beyond its reasoningto giv e federal criminal statutes ex traterritorial effect).
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544 U.S. 385 (2005).
544 U.S. 349 (2005).
202 Cf. O’Sulliv an, supra note 14, at 1075 (“Pasquantino is best understood as a case in
which the Court determined that because all the elements of the crime occurred in the
United States, the prosecution was domestic—not ex traterritorial—in nature.”).
203 Small, 544 U.S. at 387 (emphasis added) (quoting18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2000)).
204 Id. at 394.
205 Id. at 390–91.
206 18 U.S.C. § 1343.
207 Pasquantino, 544 U.S. at 354–55. The statute prohibits the use of interstate wires “to
effect any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtainingmoney or property by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses.” Id. at 355 (quoting18 U.S.C. § 1343). “Petitioners used U.S.
interstate wires to ex ecute a scheme to defraud a foreign sov ereign of tax rev enue. Their
offense was complete the moment they ex ecuted the scheme inside the United States . . . .
This domestic element of petitioners’ conduct is what the Gov ernment is punishing.” Id. at
371 (citations omitted); see also Pamela Karten Bookman, Note, Solving the
Extraterritoriality Problem: Lessons from the Honest Services Statute, 92 VA. L. REV. 749,
752 (2006) (notingthe irony that “[b]ecause statutes that ex plicitly apply only to domestic
conduct do not trigger the presumption against ex traterritorial application, they may be
201
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Ev en in foreign affairs prosecutions where cases are labeled “territorial”—i.e., that the Court classifies as not inv olv ingcriminal conduct outside of U.S. territory, thus obv iatingthe need for application
of the presumption against ex traterritoriality—courts may still display
heightened judicial deference to the ex ecutiv e, leading to erroneous
results. This dynamic played out in two Supreme Court cases—Small
v. United States 200 and Pasquantino v. United States 201 —issued on the
same day but reaching div ergent conclusions due to distinct judicial
treatment of the dual-hatted ex ecutiv e.202
The issue in both cases was whether a federal criminal statute
under which the defendant was conv icted encompassed foreign
activ ity. In these cases, the Court construed one statute to ex clude a
foreign court but the other to include harm to a foreign gov ernment.
In Small, the petitioner had been conv icted under 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1), which makes it unlawful for a person “conv icted in any
court” of a crime punishable by imprisonment ex ceedingone year to
possess a firearm, based on a prior Japanese conv iction for attempted
arms smuggling.203 Both the majority and dissent agreed that the
firearm possession was domestic; howev er, in construing the phrase
“conv icted in any court,” the majority limited the statute’s application
to prior domestic conv ictions only.204 In so doing, the majority characterized the case as territorial but also reasoned that, as in ex traterritorial cases, it should assume that Congress legislates with domestic
considerations in mind.205 In Pasquantino, howev er, the Court ruled
in the opposite way, finding that the federal wire fraud statute206
encompasses criminal schemes defrauding a foreign gov ernment, in
this case Canada.207 The majority held that the common law “rev enue
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more likely to reach conduct that has significant foreign elements or effects than statutes
that do not specify the location of the conduct to which they apply”).
208 Pasquantino, 544 U.S. at 369; Farbiarz, Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction, supra
note 16, at 527.
209 Pasquantino, 544 U.S. at 369.
210 Id. at 378 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Only Justices Ginsburgand Breyer joined Part I
of the dissentingopinion, in which this position on ex traterritoriality was put forth. Id. at
372.
211 Id. at 377.
212 Id. at 383.
213 Cf. Brogan v . United States, 522 U.S. 398 (1998) (strictly interpreting 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001 to lack any “ex culpatory no” ex ception); see also DANIEL C. RICHMAN, KATE STITH
& WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, DEFINING FEDERAL CRIMES (unpublished manuscript) (manuscript
ch. 3, at 13) (“The argument in Brogan is played out again and again, with curiously
inconsistent results.”); Bookman, supra note 207, at 754 (describingPasquantino and Small
as contradictory).
214 Small v . United States, 544 U.S. 385, 390 (2005).
215 See id. at 387; Bookman, supra note 207, at 782–83 (suggestingthat by restrictingthe
interpretation of the phrase “conv icted in any court” in the gun possession statute to

41254-nyu_94-3 Sheet No. 36 Side B

rule”—which generally bars courts from enforcingthe tax laws of foreign sov ereigns—was inapplicable, in part because the ex ecutiv e
branch could be presumed to hav e assessed a prosecution’s impact
with another country.208 The “greater danger,” the Court reasoned,
would be to bar the prosecution based on foreign policy concerns
underlying the common law rev enue rule—concerns that the Court
has “neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility to ev aluate.”209 In
dissent, Justice Ginsburgaccused the majority of ignoringthe lack of
congressional intent that the statute hav e ex traterritorial effect210 and,
furthermore, of construingthe statute ex traterritorially to enforce foreign tax laws.211 Notably, she also inv oked the rule of lenity giv en the
interpretativ e question was a close one.212
While the div ergent approaches of the Court—construing one
statute to ex clude a foreign court and the other to include harm to a
foreign gov ernment—hav e been criticized for their inconsistency,213 a
focus on the dual-hatted ex ecutiv e clarifies why the Court reached
incongruous holdings. In Small and Pasquantino, foreign affairs implications and ex ecutiv e deference are what principally differentiated the
two cases. Small lacks any language suggestingdeference to the ex ecutiv e branch’s foreign affairs authority. Indeed, the Small majority put
ex clusiv e emphasis on its own statutory reading, grounded in “an ordinary assumption about the reach of domestically oriented statutes” to
determine congressional intent.214 This was likely rooted in the fact
that the case’s foreign affairs implications were minimal: Small had
already serv ed his sentence in Japan, so the Japanese gov ernment
would be unlikely to protest his subsequent conv iction for gun possession in the United States.215 By contrast, the Canadian interest in
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Pasquantino was more pronounced, giv en that the U.S. gov ernment
was prosecutingindiv iduals who had defrauded Canada and thus were
also subject to Canadian criminal jurisdiction.216 In considering the
foreign affairs ramifications of interpretingthe rev enue rule as a bar
to prosecution for defrauding foreign gov ernments, the Pasquantino
majority relied in part on the fact that the U.S. gov ernment had
brought the prosecution, using it to nullify concerns about international friction.217 In other words, the ex ecutiv e branch’s prosecutorial
authority—which implicitly also included its foreign affairs authority
and the implied consent of the Canadian gov ernment—contributed to
the Court’s ruling in fav or of the ex ecutiv e branch’s interpretation
ov er that of the defendant.218
C. Assessing the Risk to Defendants
The doctrinal ex amples abov e demonstrate that the greatest concern about foreign affairs prosecutions is their potential risk of ex ecutiv e aggrandizement, often at the ex pense of defendant rights to
present a defense, demand notice and specificity in criminal statutes,
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domestic conv ictions, the Court “effectiv ely checks the Ex ecutiv e’s power to bringcriminal
charges by interpretingthe scope of a legislativ e enactment to be purely domestic”). She
continues to state that Small does not “require courts to address the ex tent to which the
Ex ecutiv e can carry out its foreign relations powers through criminal prosecutions because
it finds that Congress nev er granted the Ex ecutiv e the power to prosecute such a crime in
the first place,” in furtherance of her point that the presumption against ex traterritoriality
“has always been a presumption about congressional intent.” Id. at 783–84. Clearly this is
so. Howev er it is questionable whether, giv en Small is considered a territorial case, the
methodology employed by the Small majority would be entirely effectiv e in a case where
there were more substantial concerns about a prosecution’s effect on international friction
or comity.
216 In fact, Canada did indict the petitioners on sev eral charges, although it did not
request their ex tradition. Pasquantino, 544 U.S. at 375 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
217 Id. at 369 (majority opinion). As Bookman notes, “by looking to ex ecutiv e intent,
[Pasquantino] seems capable of generating an ex ception . . . for potentially all criminal
cases.” Bookman, supra note 207, at 778. In “grey zone” cases, then, there is some danger
that unless the analysis is tied to congressional intent, the Court will abdicate responsibility
for ev aluating the comity concerns that typically accompany the presumption of
ex traterritoriality to the ex ecutiv e. By contrast, it is also possible that such an untethered
analysis could go the other direction, leading to judicial infringement on the ex ecutiv e’s
foreign affairs power. Indeed, the Court assumed “that by electing to bring this
prosecution, the Ex ecutiv e has assessed this prosecution’s impact on this Nation’s
relationship with Canada, and concluded that it poses little danger of causinginternational
friction.” Pasquantino, 544 U.S. at 369.
218 The Court noted that the “prosecution create[d] little risk of causing international
friction” and that the “action was brought by the Ex ecutiv e to enforce a statute passed by
Congress.” Pasquantino, 544 U.S. at 369 (citingthe president’s foreign affairs prerogativ e);
see Bookman, supra note 207, at 777–78 (suggestingthat the Court in Pasquantino looked
to ex ecutiv e intent, rather than congressional intent, in determiningthe territorial limits of
the application of the wire fraud statute).
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See supra notes 154–60 and accompanyingtex t.
See supra notes 105–07 and accompanyingtex t.
221 See United States v . Verdugo-Urquidez, 449 U.S. 259 (1990).
222 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2012).
223 Ker v . Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 438 (1886).
224 See Frisbie v . Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952) (“This Court has nev er departed from
the rule announced in Ker v. Illinois . . . that the power of a court to try a person for crime
is not impaired by the fact that he had been brought within the court’s jurisdiction by
reason of a ‘forcible abduction.’” (citing Ker, 119 U.S. 436)); United States v . Alv arezMachain, 504 U.S. 655, 669–70 (1992) (“We conclude . . . that respondent’s abduction was
not in v iolation of the Ex tradition Treaty between the United States and Mex ico, and
220
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and enjoy consular access. Let us driv e this point home with a hypothetical. Imagine you are a U.S. national liv ingin Toronto. One night,
FBI agents kidnap you, transport you across the U.S.-Canada border,
and bring you before a New York federal judge. The judge denies
your claim that the kidnapping v iolated the U.S.-Canada ex tradition
treaty and affirms the court’s personal jurisdiction ov er you. You then
learn you were indicted almost eight years after you allegedly receiv ed
bribes while workingabroad—much longer than the fiv e-year statute
of limitations—because the prosecution was waiting to receiv e key
ev idence from Canada. Such ev idence is admitted into the record ev en
though it was obtained without a warrant. The court also rules that the
federal bribery statute criminalizes your conduct abroad, ev en though
the statutory language does not so prov ide. When you object to the
totality of this Kafkaesque scenario, the court rejects all your claims
on the grounds that the U.S. gov ernment deserv es deference.
As should now be clear, all such actions are lawful. FBI agents
may kidnap a person under Alvarez-Machain and a judge will affirm
personal jurisdiction under Ker-Frisbie.219 The statute of limitations
may be tolled up to eight years pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3292,220 and
ev idence obtained without a warrant from a foreign jurisdiction may
be admitted pursuant to a mutual legal assistance treaty.221 Furthermore, under Bowman, 18 U.S.C. § 666 (theft or bribery concerning
programs receiv ing federal funds), which is silent on ex traterritoriality,222 may be used to prosecute despite a lack of congressional
intent to that effect.
Foreign affairs prosecutions may also undermine defendant rights
when certain rules suited to transnational criminal cases impact classical criminal law norms. The Alvarez-Machain line of cases are
instructiv e here. Indeed, the facts of the case in Ker—a kidnapping
from Peru, leadingto prosecution in the United States223—prov ided a
foundation for the Court to rule similarly in the 1952 domestic Frisbie
case, and then ultimately to ex tend the doctrine again in AlvarezMachain.224 Or as another ex ample, 18 U.S.C. § 3505, which was

41254-nyu_94-3 Sheet No. 38 Side A

05/14/2019 08:58:42

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\94-3\NYU302.tx t

June 2019]

unknown

Seq: 46

13-MAY-19

FOREIGN AFFAIRS PROSECUTIONS

12:33

385

enacted in 1984, lowered the threshold for admission in criminal cases
of foreign records of regularly-conducted business activ ity by eliminating the need for a custodian to testify in court.225 Such records
could thus no longer be ex cluded as hearsay and are selfauthenticatinggiv en certain certifications are met.226 Subsequently, in
2000, the Federal Rules of Ev idence were similarly amended for
records of domestic regularly-conducted activ ity, lowering the standards for admission and authentication.227
The sum total of all of these changes to criminal prosecutions suggests a further shifting of power toward the gov ernment and away
from defendants. While each indiv idual change to criminal procedure
or substantiv e law may be, in many instances, appropriate, the cumulativ e effect may equate to a loss of defendant v oice. This in turn may
undermine fundamental assumptions about our criminal justice
system, includingthe rights to present a defense, challenge admission
of ev idence, confront witnesses, and hav e notice and specificity in
criminal statutes.
III
SPLINTERING U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
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therefore the rule of Ker v. Illinois is fully applicable to this case.” (citing Ker, 119 U.S.
436)).
225 See 18 U.S.C. § 3505.
226 Id. Such records include “a memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any
form, of acts, ev ents, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, maintained in a foreign country.”
Id. § 3505(c)(1). This can also impact civ il cases. See FED. R. EVID. 902(12) (Ev idence That
Is Self-Authenticating—Certified Foreign Records of a Regularly Conducted Activ ity,
enacted in 2000).
227 See FED. R. EVID. 803(6) (Ex ceptions to the Rule Against Hearsay—Records of a
Regularly Conducted Activ ity); FED. R. EVID. 902(11) (Ev idence That Is SelfAuthenticating—Certified Domestic Records of a Regularly Conducted Activ ity).
228 See Memorandum from the Office of the Attorney Gen. to Heads of Dep’t
Components & All U.S. Att’ys (May 11, 2009), https://www.justice.gov /oip/foia-library/
communications_with_the_white_house_and_congress_2009.pdf/download [hereinafter
Memorandum] (“[T]he Justice Department will adv ise the White House concerning
pendingor contemplated criminal or civ il inv estigations or cases when—but only when—it
is important for the performance of the President’s duties and appropriate from a law
enforcement perspectiv e.”).
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Foreign affairs prosecutions may also adv ersely impact U.S. foreign policy. As is well known domestically, criminal justice is highly
decentralized: Prosecutorial power is div ided into ninety-three autonomous U.S. Attorneys Offices (USAOs), certain prosecuting offices
within Main Justice itself, and fifty states, each with div erse
prosecutorial structures. Additionally, the U.S. criminal justice system
is strongly autonomous: DOJ policy dictates a strongseparation from
White House ov ersight regardingcriminal inv estigations.228
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This decentralization and autonomy can easily generate dissonance within the foreign policy decisionmaking mechanisms of the
ex ecutiv e branch.229 First, decentralization means an indiv idual
USAO anywhere in the country could make an independent decision
to inv estigate and prosecute—doing so without any clearance by the
DOJ’s Office of International Affairs or other office higher up within
the ex ecutiv e branch—in a manner that is undesirable for U.S. foreign
relations. For ex ample, in 2013, the USAO in the Southern District of
New York charged and arrested Indian Deputy Consul General
Dev yani Khobragade on charges of v isa fraud relating to an Indian
national she brought to the United States as a housekeeper and allegedly paid less than the minimum wage.230 After the arrest, the Indian
gov ernment responded with counter-measures threateningsecurity at
the U.S. embassy in Delhi.231 And ev en if a USAO clears its inv estigatory or prosecutorial steps “up the chain” of the DOJ, autonomy
means that DOJ would not normally inform the other ex ecutiv e agencies of its actions.232 This means that prosecutors are, in essence,
making independent decisions domestically on cases that are v iewed
internationally as an ex tension of U.S. foreign policy.
To some degree, foreign policy blowback from domestic law
enforcement inev itably results from the United States properly ex ercisingits prosecutorial function. So, for ex ample, the December 2018
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229 Such dissonance is not unique to the ex ecutiv e branch. The doctrinal mantra that the
United States speaks with “one v oice” belies the impact of all three branches of
gov ernment and state gov ernments on U.S. foreign relations. See Sarah H. Clev eland,
Crosby and the “One-Voice” Myth in U.S. Foreign Relations, 46 VILL. L. REV. 975,
984–1001 (2001) (rev iewing the role of the three federal gov ernment branches and state
gov ernments in the constitutional tex t, U.S. history, and practice).
230 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice & U.S. Attorney’s Office, S. Dist. of N.Y.,
Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces Arrest of Indian Consular Officer for Visa Fraud
and False Statements in Connection with Household Employee’s Visa Application (Dec.
12, 2013), https://www.justice.gov /usao-sdny/pr/manhattan-us-attorney-announces-arrestindian-consular-officer-v isa-fraud-and-false.
231 See Jeremy Carl, Did India Overreact to Diplomat’s Arrest?, CNN (Jan. 14, 2014),
https://www.cnn.com/2013/12/20/opinion/carl-india-dispute-priv ilege/index .html (“In the
wake of the arrest, India announced a number of steps against U.S. diplomats, including
rev oking gov ernment-issued IDs for U.S. diplomats in India, stopping the U.S. Embassy
from importingmost goods, and most prov ocativ ely remov inga concrete security barricade
at the U.S. Embassy in Delhi.”); Karen DeYoung& Sari Horwitz, In Dispute over Indian
Diplomat, an Internal U.S. Rift and Many Unanswered Questions, WASH. POST (Dec. 19,
2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-dispute-ov er-indiandiplomat-an-internal-us-rift-and-many-unanswered-questions/2013/12/19/0a84f21c-68dd11e3-ae56-22de072140a2_story.html?utm_term=.cdc110aa1209 (noting that Main Justice
was unaware of the arrest).
232 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL § 1-7.100, https://www.justice.gov /jm/
jm-1-7000-media-relations (last updated Apr. 2018) (General Need for Confidentiality);
Memorandum, supra note 228.
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arrest of Huawei ex ecutiv e Meng Wanzhou potentially complicates
the U.S. relationship with China—including the trade relationship—
but does so due to what appear to be legitimate charges of Huawei’s
v iolation of ex port controls and U.S. sanctions relating to Iran and
other countries.233 And, sometimes, law enforcement and foreign
policy objectiv es can interact synergistically to achiev e a positiv e outcome. For ex ample, some foreign observ ers hailed the May 2015
arrest and unsealingof E.D.N.Y. indictments against FIFA officials in
Switzerland as “[t]he best American foreign policy action” of the
year.234 This made some sense, giv en that nearly all soccer-lov ing
countries around the world had longdespised FIFA as corrupt.235 And
yet something potentially pernicious lurks in this statement: Foreign
media regarded it as part of the United States’ broader diplomatic
agenda and thus implicitly as part of its system of foreign policy
checks—as opposed to a decision largely driv en by federal law
enforcement ex igencies, separate from direct White House
ov ersight.236
This conflation of U.S. law enforcement and foreign policy is
more salient when foreign gov ernments and media criticize the United
States for its “longarm” into foreign countries.237 For ex ample, both

05/14/2019 08:58:42

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3398955

41254-nyu_94-3 Sheet No. 39 Side A

233 See Stev en Arrigg Koh, The Huawei Arrest: How It Likely Happened and What
Comes Next, JUST SECURITY (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/61799/huaweiarrest-happened.
234 Daniel W. Drezner, The Best American Foreign Policy Action Taken in 2015, WASH.
POST (May 27, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/postev erything/wp/2015/05/27/thebest-american-foreign-policy-action-taken-in-2015/?utm_term=.d94af2372a82.
235 United States Welcomed as Liberators by Soccer Fans Around the World,
GLOBALPOST (May 27, 2015), https://www.pri.org/stories/2015-05-27/united-stateswelcomed-liberators-soccer-fans-around-world.
236 See, e.g., Jon Sopel, Fifa Scandal: Is the Long Arm of US Law Now Overreaching?,
BBC NEWS (June 4, 2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-33011847 (“Barack
Obama’s presidency has been marked by his determination to pull US troops out of
foreign conflicts, to admit past mistakes and to say it is not for us to pick and choose which
world leaders we like. But is America creatinga new legal imperialism?”).
237 See, e.g., The Anti-Bribery Business, E CONOMIST (May 9, 2015), https://
www.economist.com/news/business/21650557-enforcement-laws-against-corporate-briberyincreases-there-are-risks-it-may-go (stating in subtitle that “[a]s the enforcement of laws
against corporate bribery increases, there are risks that it may go too far”); Sopel, supra
note 236 (“Some of the charges relate to alleged crimes in the US, but there are massiv e
implications to . . . ETJ—Ex traterritorial Jurisdiction. . . . [I]t seems to me to be the right of
the US to poke its nose into anyone’s affairs anywhere in the world.”). This “longarm”
raises the concern of ev er-ex panding U.S. jurisdiction ov er crimes with a foreign nex us,
further underscoring the risk to defendants enumerated in Section II.C. supra; see also
United States v . Hoskins, 902 F.3d 69, 96 (2d Cir. 2018) (“[T]he FCPA does not impose
liability on a foreign national who is not an agent, employee, officer, director, or
shareholder of an American issuer or domestic concern—unless that person commits a
crime within the territory of the United States.”). As noted abov e, such questions arise, for
ex ample, when courts consider whether Congress may enact certain federal statutes that
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the DOJ and SEC take an ex pansiv e v iew of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, giv ingthe United States jurisdiction ov er a wide v ariety
of transactions,238 including those occurring abroad between foreign
actors that are merely denominated in U.S. dollars.239 Pushback from
foreign countries like France has ex tended not just into the law
enforcement cooperation space, but also into broader bilateral relations.240 And Alvarez-Machain triggered diplomatic protest from
Mex ico, leadingto a temporary cessation of all DEA activ ity there.241
Thus, foreign affairs prosecutions may sometimes constitute an undesirable parallel “second arm” of U.S. foreign policy, unfoldingoutside
of traditional foreign policy checks but then generating diplomatic
controv ersy. This longarm may be inev itable, giv en U.S. inv estigators
and prosecutors enjoy relativ e freedom compared to their civ il law
country counterparts.242 But certain law enforcement policy decisions
in this space reflect the negativ e consequences of the broad ex ecutiv e
authority described abov e.
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enable foreign affairs prosecutions. See id. at 103. Future scholarship must consider what
the proper limits of such reach should be—as a matter of both law and criminal law
enforcement policy—and its intersection with U.S. foreign policy.
238 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL DIV. & U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, ENF’T
DIV., FCPA: A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 11
(2012), https://www.justice.gov /sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2015/01/16/guide.pdf
(“Thus, placing a telephone call or sending an e-mail, tex t message, or fax from, to, or
through the United States inv olv es interstate commerce—as does sendinga wire transfer
from or to a U.S. bank or otherwise usingthe U.S. bankingsystem . . . .”); see also Hoskins,
902 F.3d at 96.
239 See Supreme Court Questions Whether Dollar-Denominated Transactions or Other
Financial Transactions in the U.S. Are Sufficient to Assert Jurisdiction over Foreign
Corporations, FCPA PROFESSOR (May 8, 2018), http://fcpaprofessor.com/supreme-courtquestions-whether-dollar-denominated-transactions-financial-transactions-u-s-sufficientassert-jurisdiction-foreign-corporations (describinghow sev eral FCPA enforcement actions
hav e alleged jurisdiction because the transactions were denominated in U.S. dollars).
240 See Frederick T. Dav is, Where Are We Today in the International Fight Against
Overseas Corruption: An Historical Perspective, and Two Problems Going Forward, 23
INT’L L. STUDENTS ASS’N J. INT’L & COMP. L. 337, 340–42 (2017). The same has occurred
with foreign affairs prosecutions against foreign banks. Verdier, supra note 18, at 36–37
(notingthat foreign gov ernments complain about U.S. prosecutors unfairly treatingforeign
banks and the financial implications of U.S. criminal sanctions).
241 See U.S. Tries to Calm Mexico over Court’s Kidnap Ruling, CHI. TRIB. (June 17,
1992), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1992-06-17/news/9202230639_1_rene-martinv erdugo-urquidez-dr-humberto-alv arez-machain-mex ico-city (“The Bush administration,
eager to calm an outraged Mex ican gov ernment Tuesday, pledged not to kidnap any more
criminal suspects in its southern neighbor’s territory if Mex ico v ows to prosecute them
promptly.”).
242 As a general rule, the judiciary has more checks ov er civ il law country inv estigators
earlier in the criminal inv estigatory process. Dav is, supra note 240, at 340 (“Simply put,
U.S. prosecutors hav e powers that most of their European counterparts can only dream of
. . . .”).
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Finally, the foreign policy consequences of foreign affairs prosecutions also cut the other way: Countries ex tending their criminal
legal reach into the United States may also complicate U.S. foreign
policy. For ex ample, after the failed Turkish coup attempt in 2016,
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan demanded the ex tradition of cleric
Fetullah Gulen, who is located in the United States and is alleged to
hav e been behind the attack.243 While the United States is obligated
to ex tradite under the U.S.-Turkey ex tradition treaty, it has not initiated ex tradition proceedings on the ground that the ex tradition
request is deficient in showingev idence of Gulen’s participation in the
attempted coup.244 This impasse has strained bilateral relations. By
late 2017, both countries had suspended non-immigrant v isas, and
Turkey had both indicted Turkish nationals working in the U.S.
embassy and a dozen U.S. nationals accused of ties to Gulen.245 To
make matters worse, U.S. failure to ex tradite Gulen has led to “widespread speculation” amongst the Turkish population that the United
States orchestrated the coup attempt in Turkey.246 And in August
2018, President Erdogan wrote in a New York Times op-ed to the
American people that the Gulen case represented one of the issues
puttingthe U.S.-Turkish relationship in jeopardy.247
The Gulen case thus prov ides a rich ex ample of the role that foreign affairs prosecutions play in U.S. foreign policy. The blame for
lack of ex tradition actually falls to Turkey: The Turkish gov ernment
has failed to prov ide sufficient ev idence in its ex tradition request to
meet U.S. domestic standards for ex tradition.248 And yet the broader
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243 Karen DeYoung, Turkish Evidence for Gulen Extradition Pre-Dates Coup Attempt,
WASH. POST (Aug. 19, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/
turkish-ev idence-for-gulen-ex tradition-pre-dates-coup-attempt/2016/08/19/390cb0ec-665611e6-be4e-23fc4d4d12b4_story.html?utm_term=.b281ff42b83b.
244 Id.
245 Umar Farooq, Relations Between U.S. and Turkey Grow Tense, with Both Countries
Suspending Routine Visas, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/world/
middleeast/la-fg-turkey-us-v isas-20171008-story.html.
246 Id.
247 Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Opinion, Erdogan: How Turkey Sees the Crisis with the U.S.,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/10/opinion/turkey-erdogantrump-crisis-sanctions.html (“The Turkish people ex pected the United States to
unequiv ocally condemn the attack and ex press solidarity with Turkey’s elected leadership.
It did not. . . . To make matters worse, there has been no progress regarding Turkey’s
request for the ex tradition of Fethullah Gulen under a bilateral treaty.”). Other cases, such
as the temporary detention of American pastor Andrew Brunson, hav e also rev ealed
possible tensions between the United States and Turkey. See Carlotta Gall, Turkey Frees
Pastor Andrew Brunson, Easing Tensions With U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/10/12/world/europe/turkey-us-pastor-andrew-brunson.html.
248 DeYoung, supra note 243 (“‘At this point, Turkish authorities hav e not put forward
a formal ex tradition request based on ev idence that he was inv olv ed in the coup’
attempt.”).
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tension between two NATO allies obscures this ex planation,249
leadingto a foreign country’s popular inference that the United States
orchestrated a coup against it. Lookingahead, what would happen if
some of the doctrinal ex amples abov e were to begin playingout in this
case? We might imagine a case of Turkish law enforcement agents kidnappingGulen in Pennsylv ania and bringinghim to Turkey for prosecution under their equiv alent of the Ker-Frisbie-Alvarez-Machain
doctrine. And why not?250 Turkey obv iously has a greater national
interest in the arrest and prosecution of the alleged leader of a coup
attempt than the United States did in a Mex ican doctor allegedly
inv olv ed in the torture and killingof one DEA agent, as in AlvarezMachain. This is not merely hypothetical: Former Trump
Administration National Security Adv iser Michael Flynn reportedly
discussed with the Turkish gov ernment the possibility of hav ingGulen
kidnapped and sent to Turkey in ex change for $15 million.251
The Gulen case also ex emplifies future trends as all countries
ex pand their capacities for foreign affairs prosecutions. As another
ex ample, China has recently garnered attention for sendingits agents
into other countries to surv eil, intimidate, and ev en attempt to kidnap
Chinese fugitiv es there.252 This means that more indiv iduals worldwide will be brought before a judiciary that does not ev en conceiv e of
itself as independent.253 Foreign affairs prosecutions thus trigger concerns of criminal justice dynamics ov erlaid onto the thousands of
bilateral relations amongcountries worldwide, in some cases strengthening—but also potentially hindering—such relationships.
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249 See Erin Cunningham & Kareem Fahim, U.S. and Turkey Announce Tit-For-Tat
Travel Restrictions, a Sign of Deteriorating Alliance, WASH. POST (Oct. 8, 2017), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/us-halts-some-v isa-serv ices-in-turkey-citing-securityconcerns/2017/10/08/02bdc01a-ac52-11e7-9b93-b97043e57a22_story.html?tid=a_inl&utm_
term=.23f2fcc0febd.
250 This is not a predictiv e claim regarding the likelihood of unilateral Turkish law
enforcement action; ex tra-legal foreign policy considerations may prev ent this from
occurring. Nonetheless, this ex ample underscores that the Turkish gov ernment could—and
likely does—assert abduction as a legally av ailable option.
251 Julian Borger, Ex-Trump Aide Flynn Investigated over Plot to Kidnap Turkish
Dissident–Report, GUARDIAN (Nov . 10, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/
nov /10/michael-flynn-trump-turkish-dissident-cleric-plot.
252 China’s Law-Enforcers Are Going Global, ECONOMIST (Mar. 31, 2018), https://
www.economist.com/china/2018/03/31/chinas-law-enforcers-are-going-global (noting that
China has resorted to such tactics in part because only thirty-six countries hav e ratified
bilateral ex tradition treaties with it).
253 Michael Forsythe, China’s Chief Justice Rejects an Independent Judiciary, and
Reformers Wince, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/18/world/
asia/china-chief-justice-courts-zhou-qiang.html.
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254 See Adam Muchmore, International Activity and Domestic Law, 1 PENN STATE J.
INT’L AFF. 363, 363–64 (2012) (“Broadly speaking, two types of law are relev ant to
international affairs. The first is international law, consisting of norms embodied in
treaties, custom, general principles, and judicial decisions . . . . The second is domestic law,
the positiv e law of indiv idual states . . . .”).
255 See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 3021(a) (2012) (describing the role of the National Security
Council); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, PRACTICING LAW IN THE OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISER,
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How can foreign affairs prosecutions better deliv er on their
promise of criminal accountability, while also mitigating risk to foreign policy and defendant interests? The answer is not straightforward: Foreign affairs prosecutions are wide-ranging, with implications
for treaties, statutes, and procedure, as well as obligations for all three
branches of gov ernment. And the cases raise a v ariety of rich and
weighty questions, giv en that both crimes and foreign policy represent
critical areas of law and public policy. For ex ample, might the United
States be “criminalizing” foreign policy, finding ways to use foreign
affairs prosecutions as part of its broader diplomatic agenda? How
might foreign affairs prosecutions complicate other bilateral issues,
such as our trade relationships?254 What are the implications for federalism giv en that many otherwise-local cases are suddenly in the
hands of the federal gov ernment, which wields the foreign affairs
power? And how will these cases impact the dev elopment of international law, namely the dev elopment of treaties, customary international law, and both global and regional legal institutions? Giv en these
questions, the followingrepresents an initial—but by no means ex clusiv e—set of suggestions to strengthen foreign affairs prosecutions.
As a preliminary matter, ideally the ex ecutiv e branch should alter
its internal workingprocedures to promote intra-ex ecutiv e coordination and obv iate undesirable foreign policy consequences. DOJ, for
ex ample, could become more amenable to a policy of limited disclosure of inv estigations and indictments to other relev ant ex ecutiv e
agencies engaged in foreign policy, particularly the State Department.
Such ex ecutiv e branch coordination already ex ists ad hoc: The Legal
Adv iser’s office and relev ant State Department regional bureaus
adv ise on certain foreign and international issues arisingfrom criminal
cases at home and abroad; the National Security Council conv enes
and ov ersees issues of national security throughout the ex ecutiv e
branch; and the v arious ex ecutiv e agencies meet in a v ariety of formal
and informal ways in order to adv ance specific agenda items.255 And
domestically, federal and state prosecutors should and do consult with
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the DOJ’s Office of International Affairs regarding the broader
effects of a giv en prosecution.256
At the same time, howev er, ex ecutiv e branch agencies are
unlikely to reform internally unless certain statutory, doctrinal, or
institutional incentiv es demand that they do so. As other scholars
hav e noted, ev ery agency has some degree of “tunnel v ision” as it pursues its statutory mandate, and intra-agency reform is unlikely unless
structural changes force all to internalize costs.257 This is inev itable
and not necessarily undesirable. In foreign affairs prosecutions, DOJ
will doggedly pursue its federal law enforcement mission—which will
tend toward more ex pansiv e readings of treaties, federal statutes, and
doctrine—with an eye toward preserv ing cooperativ e law enforcement relationships with foreign national counterparts, but likely
lackingcomprehensiv e awareness of and sensitiv ity to diplomatic considerations. The State Department, likewise, will hav e its own incentiv es for cultiv atingdiplomatic relations, sometimes at the ex pense of
criminal accountability in specific cases.258 Furthermore, there is a
strong norm against DOJ disclosure of inv estigations and—as tested
recently in today’s political climate—political influence on decisions
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https://www.state.gov /documents/organization/244958.pdf (last v isited Feb. 16, 2019)
(rev iewingthe functions of the Office of Law Enforcement and Intelligence).
256 Paul B. Stephan, Private Litigation as a Foreign Relations Problem, 110 AM. J. INT’L
L. UNBOUND 40, 42 (2016).
257 See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 126, at 1174–75 (“[A]gencies . . . pursue their
statutory mission with v aryingdegrees of diligence, but often without sufficient regard to a
larger normativ e framework such as the Constitution.”). Dan Kahan has argued that
Chevron could moderate aggressiv e readings of criminal statutes by shifting lawmaking
responsibility from indiv idual USAOs to Main Justice. Kahan, supra note 12, at 497, 519.
In his contention, Main Justice is much more likely to internalize the costs of such readings
because, in part, it must justify its broad interpretations in public and through the
President, who is directly accountable to the electorate. Id. Such reforms could include,
inter alia, central DOJ approv al for initiatingcases and dev elopment of DOJ guidelines for
cooperation between DOJ and other regulators. Verdier, supra note 18, at 58.
258 An intriguing ex ample of this tension occurred during the negotiation of the 2016
Colombian peace deal. U.S. indictments and ex tradition requests in place for certain
Rev olutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) leaders posed a source of debate in the
negotiations, which inv olv ed U.S. diplomats. Nick Miroff, Colombian Peace Deal Could
Mark Rare Victory for U.S. Diplomacy, WASH. POST (Aug. 27, 2016), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/colombian-peace-deal-marks-rare-v ictoryfor-us-diplomacy/2016/08/27/0d0ac8aa-6ad7-11e6-91cb-ecb5418830e9_story.html. From
DOJ’s perspectiv e, it was unlikely that indiv idual USAOs would withdraw their
indictments or ex tradition requests for such indiv iduals. See id.; Colombia: President Santos
Wants Rebels off Terror List, NBC NEWS (Jan. 29, 2016), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/
latino/colombia-president-santos-wants-rebels-terror-list-n506801. In the end, the U.S.
gov ernment ultimately agreed not to press the Colombian gov ernment to act on the
ex tradition requests. Miroff, supra. Such a balance tracks broader “peace v s. justice”
debates in international criminal legal literature. See, e.g., Richard J. Goldstone, Peace
Versus Justice, 6 NEV. L.J. 421, 423 (2005) (describing the balance between post-conflict
peace and criminal accountability in the former Yugoslav ia, South Africa, and Iraq).
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259 See, e.g., Michael D. Shear & Katie Benner, News Analysis, Trump’s War on the
Justice System Threatens to Erode Trust in the Law, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/08/25/us/politics/trump-justice-legal-system.html (“The president’s
public judgments about the country’s top law enforcement agencies rev olv e largely around
how their actions affect him personally—a v ision that would recast the traditionally
independent justice system as a guardian of the president and an attack dog against his
adv ersaries.”).
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to inv estigate or prosecute.259 Thus, while some adaptation of this protocol—in a space already characterized by adapted criminal procedure—could mitigate certain foreign policy risks, such changes are
unlikely without judicial and legislativ e reforms.
This ex ecutiv e institutional reality thus puts greater emphasis on
the courts and Congress to mitigate the risks to defendant rights and
foreign policy. This is largely rooted in the customary roles of each
branch in classical criminal cases, namely, that Congress prov ides the
necessary legislativ e direction regardingsubstantiv e criminal law and
criminal procedure, while courts—operatingwithin this framework—
use a v ariety of judicial tools to ensure that ex ecutiv e power does not
ex ceed this legislativ e mandate. Indeed, an initial prescriptiv e temptation might be to argue that all foreign affairs prosecutions should be
treated like classical criminal cases, and yet that would ov erlook the
subtleties at play in treaty interpretation, not to mention the broader
foreign policy ramifications of a giv en case. Alternativ ely, one might
argue that such cases should be treated squarely as foreign affairs matters; as has already been seen, howev er, this creates undesirable consequences for indiv idual rights. Neither ex treme is desirable. A better
approach should balance the necessities of both criminal and foreign
affairs law through greater congressional engagement and judicial
ov ersight.
Turning, then, to the judiciary, an initial tension between normativ e concerns is obv ious. On one hand, a more interv entionist role for
the judiciary may protect indiv idual rights pressured in such cases. But
in doingso, the judiciary could risk underminingthe ex ecutiv e’s foreign affairs authority. In other words, any shift in the judicialex ecutiv e balance ostensibly bolsters one of two opposingv alues. And
yet a better way forward is possible, rooted in the separation-of-power
rationales animating judicial decisionmaking in criminal and foreign
relations law. The goal is to narrow, but not eliminate, the current
degree of deference to ensure greater accountability and protection
for indiv idual rights.
In criminal law, it is well settled that all prosecutions must hav e
clear statutory authority, i.e., authority that the political branches
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260 See United States v . Hudson and Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812) (“Certain
implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts of justice from the nature of their
institution.”). But see DANIEL C. RICHMAN, KATE STITH & WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, DEFINING
FEDERAL CRIMES (unpublished manuscript) (manuscript ch. 3, at 6) (on file with New
York Univ ersity Law Rev iew) (“Federal courts wound up ex ercisingmore power than if
the field had been a part of the common law from the beginning. . . . [P]resent-day federal
courts are quicker to rely on the common law when construingcriminal statutes . . . .”).
261 See, e.g., supra note 116 and accompanying tex t (citing cases affirming lack of
deference to the prosecution’s interpretation of criminal law).
262 Another conception of foreign affairs prosecutions is that the ex ecutiv e branch is
being“double counted,” first as a prosecutor and then as a diplomat by the judiciary.
263 United States v . Curtiss-Wright Ex port Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
264 Ev an Criddle, Commentary, Chev ron Deference and Treaty Interpretation, 112 YALE
L.J. 1927, 1930 (2003) (quotingAir Fr. v . Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 399 (1985)). For this reason,
perhaps, most other nations’ judiciaries do not defer to their ex ecutiv e branch’s treaty
interpretations. Van Alstine, supra note 129, at 592–93.
265 Bookman, supra note 207, at 778 (“By assuming. . . that the gov ernment thoroughly
considers international comity and foreign relations concerns before bringing any
prosecution, the Court imputes coordination and unanimity between the Justice
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define pursuant to statute.260 The judiciary, for its part, recognizes this
legislativ e primacy and uses traditional tools of statutory and constitutional interpretation to resolv e questions of law in this space, without
giv ingpreferential treatment to the state’s ex pertise in this regard.261
Canons of construction such as the rule of lenity ensure this legislativ e
primacy, check gov ernment power, and help to safeguard indiv idual
rights.
To some degree, such criminal legal reasoninghas broken down
in foreign affairs prosecutions because of the confusion about criminal
cases in this transnational space. In a transnational setting, the quest
for punishment may steer perilously close to double punishment or
jeopardy for a single crime, which would plainly offend the principle
of non bis in idem.262 And although one rationale for foreign affairs
deference is that the ex ecutiv e branch “has the better opportunity of
knowing the conditions which prev ail in foreign countries,”263 the
strong ex ecutiv e interest in conv iction in criminal cases weakens the
rationale for ov erreliance on ex ecutiv e interpretation of treaties and
statutes. Indeed, such deference can risk undermining the judicial
practice of interpretingtreaties as the “shared ex pectations of the contractingparties” when the ex ecutiv e branch instead adv ocates for an
interpretation that it has been incentiv ized to make for purposes of
domestic political gain.264 This is especially true in foreign affairs prosecutions, where DOJ has a strong interest in conv iction. Giv ing the
ex ecutiv e branch too much say in interpretation of criminal statutes
thus risks prioritizingDOJ ov er other U.S. gov ernment agencies, particularly the State Department.265 Alvarez-Machain ex emplified this
problem. As noted abov e, the case had undesirable foreign policy con-
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sequences, triggering condemnation from a wide array of gov ernments; the dissent recognized that the State Department Legal
Adv iser had prev iously questioned the wisdom of forcible
abductions.266
The better judicial approach should continue to balance foreign
affairs and criminal interests, but do so in a manner that is tilted away
from foreign affairs deference and toward criminal legal reasoning.
Courts could deploy “consultativ e deference,” another point on the
Eskridge-Baer continuum, which is not an ex plicit deference regime
but instead “relies on some input from the agency (e.g., amicus briefs,
interpretiv e rules or guidance, or manuals) and uses that input to
guide its reasoning and decisionmaking process.”267 As an ex ample,
the plurality in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 268 engaged in this sort of consultativ e deference when rulingon whether procedures for military commissions v iolated the Uniform Code of Military Justice.269 The Court
considered the President’s judgments on statutory “practicability” but
at no point embraced Justice Thomas’s v iew that the Court’s “duty
[was] to defer to the President’s understanding” under CurtissWright.270 From this v antage point, the judiciary may use traditional
tools of statutory and constitutional interpretation—upholding the
principle of legality under the rule of lenity and due process v agueness
doctrines, for ex ample—to resolv e questions of law in this space, with
ex ecutiv e consultation on foreign affairs aspects.271 This form of deference would prov ide a basis for accommodatingforeign affairs while
better safeguarding indiv idual rights, and, in doing so, would recognize that such prosecutions are indeed different due to their foreign
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Department and the State Department without any indication that the latter, which has its
own interests, communicates its preferences to the former.”).
266 See Bush, supra note 2, at 942; supra Section II.B.2; United States v . Alv arezMachain, 504 U.S. 655, 679 n.21 (1992) (Stev ens, J., dissenting) (“When Abraham Sofaer,
Legal Adv iser of the State Department, was questioned at a congressional hearing, he
resisted the notion that such seizures were acceptable: ‘Can you imagine us goinginto Paris
and seizing some person we regard as a terrorist . . . ?’” (quoting Bill To Authorize
Prosecution of Terrorists and Others Who Attack U.S. Government Employees and Citizens
Abroad: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec. & Terrorism of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 63 (1985) (statement of Abraham Sofaer, Legal Adv iser,
U.S. Dep’t of State))).
267 Eskridge & Baer, supra note 126, at 1099.
268 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
269 Eskridge & Baer, supra note 126, at 1112 (“The Court stated that it would accord
‘deference’ to the President’s judgment as to practicability, but found that the President
had reached no public judgment as to the section 836(b) uniformity requirement.” (quoting
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 622–23 & n.51)).
270 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 718–19 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 632 (majority opinion)
(rejectingJustice Thomas’s argument).
271 See O’Sulliv an, supra note 14, at 1090–91.
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policy aspects. The reduced deference will also decrease the chance of
reliance on the DOJ to the detriment of other agencies.272
So, for ex ample, the approach of the Supreme Court in Small—
relyingon the traditional tools of domestic statutory interpretation to
ensure that an indiv idual was not conv icted of a federal crime due to a
statutory ambiguity273—was the correct one. The Court engaged in a
similar analysis in Bond v. United States, reasoningthat Congress did
not intend the Chemical Weapons Conv ention Implementation Act,
which implemented the Conv ention on the Prohibition of the
Dev elopment, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons
and on Their Destruction, to allow for the prosecution of an isolated
incident of one indiv idual using tox ic chemicals to poison her husband’s lov er.274 The approach of Pasquantino, by contrast, was the
wrong one because it delegated part of its interpretativ e task to the
ex ecutiv e based on an assumption that the ex ecutiv e branch had
already resolv ed any foreign conflict and, furthermore, disregarded
the rule of lenity when construing an arguably ambiguous statute.275
Justice Ginsburg, in dissent, was thus right in statingthat “the Court
ignore[d] the absence of anything signaling Congress’s intent to giv e
the statute such an ex traordinary ex traterritorial effect” and that “the

05/14/2019 08:58:42

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3398955

41254-nyu_94-3 Sheet No. 43 Side B

272 Eskridge & Baer, supra note 126, at 1112 (“The Justices understand that the Solicitor
General is prov idingagency-based inputs that no one else is prov iding, while at the same
time remainingfree from the agency’s sometimes blindered (or captured) point of v iew.”).
273 Small v . United States, 544 U.S. 384, 394 (2005) (“In sum, we hav e no reason to
believ e that Congress considered the added enforcement adv antages flowing from
inclusion of foreign crimes . . . . The statute itself and its history offer only congressional
silence.”).
274 Bond v . United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2083 (2014). While the opinion of the Court
and the concurring opinions agreed that the Conv ention, which aimed at controlling
chemical weapons, was “a matter of great international concern,” id. at 897 (Alito, J.,
concurring), they disagreed as to the scope of the treaty power itself, the authority of
Congress to rely on the treaty power to implement subsequent legislation, and whether the
statute applied to Bond’s conduct in the particular case. See id. at 2094 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (“As sweeping and unsettling as the Chemical Weapons Conv ention
Implementation Act of 1998 may be, it is clear beyond doubt that it cov ers what Bond did;
and we hav e no authority to amend it.”); id. at 2103 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[T]he
Treaty Power is itself a limited federal power.”); id. at 2111 (Alito, J., concurring) (“I
believ e that the treaty power is limited to agreements that address matters of legitimate
international concern.”). Dav id Sloss shows that the judiciary misread the statute, which
likely does criminalize Bond’s conduct. Dav id Sloss, Bond v . United States: Choosing the
Lesser of Two Evils, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1583, 1589 (2015) (“The Bond majority
concluded as a matter of statutory interpretation that the . . . Act did not reach defendant’s
conduct. That interpretation of the statute is untenable because it is based on the Court’s
failure to appreciate the crucial differences between the 1925 Genev a Protocol and the
1993 [Conv ention].”). Thus, while this case is an ex ample of courts engagingin statutory
interpretation without undue deference to the ex ecutiv e, it also highlights the concern that
courts may err in such interpretations.
275 Pasquantino v . United States, 544 U.S. 349, 383 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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rule of lenity counsels against adopting the Court’s interpretation of
§ 1343.”276
The Supreme Court has already taken an analogous turn with the
political question doctrine.277 In Baker v. Carr, the Court narrowed
the range of cases plausibly considered to be political, articulatingits
well-known six -part test.278 More recently, Zivotofsky v. Clinton narrowed the test ev en further, reaffirmingthe political question doctrine
as a “narrow ex ception” to the judicial responsibility to decide cases,
and affirming that the doctrine should not apply in cases where a
court is called upon to decide questions of statutory interpretation or
statutory constitutionality.279 In essence, the Court affirmed that in
cases where plaintiffs seek to affirm a statutory right, judicial inquiry
begins not with whether the issue is a political question, but whether
the statute is constitutional and may be enforced against the ex ecutiv e.280 Similarly, in foreign affairs prosecutions, judicial analysis must
also start with conv entional criminal law statutory interpretation, not
with ex ceptional foreign affairs deference.281
This judicial reorientation could galv anize the political branches
to enact new or amended legislation to clarify defendant interests in
foreign affairs prosecutions. For ex ample, Congress should prov ide
276

Id. at 378.
To be clear, this analogy merely demonstrates that courts may affirm that certain
categories of cases need not be v iewed as ex ceptional and are amenable to judicial
resolution using traditional interpretativ e tools. Political questions apply only to civ il
actions; if the gov ernment brings a criminal case, it must define any issues as legal
questions and show that the defendant v iolated the law. See Tara Leigh Grov e, The Lost
History of the Political Question Doctrine, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1908, 1920 (2015) (“The
traditional political question doctrine was not limited to civ il disputes . . . but also applied
in criminal prosecutions.”).
278 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
279 566 U.S. 189, 195 (2012).
280 JARED P. COLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43834, THE POLITICAL QUESTION
DOCTRINE: JUSTICIABILITY AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 23 (2014), https://fas.org/
sgp/crs/misc/R43834.pdf; see also Japan Whaling Ass’n v . Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S.
221, 230 (1986) (“[T]he courts hav e the authority to construe treaties and ex ecutiv e
agreements, and it goes without saying that interpreting congressional legislation is a
recurringand accepted task for the federal courts.”).
281 This turn in the political question doctrine parallels another analogous trend, what
Sitaraman and Wuerth hav e coined the “normalization” of foreign relations law. Sitaraman
& Wuerth, supra note 125. They hav e argued that the Supreme Court, in recent years, has
laudably treated foreign relations law as unex ceptional, applyingmore traditional tools of
judicial rev iew to such cases. Id. at 1901. But see Bradley, supra note 11, at 294 (notingthe
conceptual and methodological limitations of Sitaraman and Wuerth’s article). Harlan
Cohen has also noted this lack of deference in the Roberts Court, one that is
counterbalanced by continuing high deference in the lower courts. Harlan G. Cohen,
Formalism and Distrust: Foreign Affairs Law in the Roberts Court, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
380, 384, 440 (2015). Foreign affairs prosecutions would benefit from a similar
normalization.
277
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282 This could be a statute-by-statute rev ision or, alternativ ely, a general code instructing
courts on the geographic scope of particular statutes. See O’Sulliv an, supra note 14, at
1094–95.
283 See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 77, at 544 (“[F]ederal criminal legislation often begins
with the Justice Department and responds to pressure from that department and from U.S.
Attorneys’ offices.”).
284 FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(c)(4), (d)(1)(F) (gov erning initial appearances for persons
ex tradited to the United States and consular rights under the Vienna Conv ention on
Consular Relations); FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.1 (Foreign Law Determination); FED. R. CRIM.
P. 58(b)(2)(H) (consular rights).
285 FED. R. CRIM. P. 5 adv isory committee’s note to 2014 amendment; FED. R. CRIM. P.
58 adv isory committee’s note to 2014 amendment.
286 See CLOUD Act, Pub. L. No. 115-141, 132 Stat. 1214 (2018).
287 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018).
288 Microsoft Corp. v . United States, 829 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2016).
289 Id. at 210.
290 Id. at 232 (Lynch, J., concurring). Judge Lynch notes also that “the main reason that
both the majority and I decide this case against the gov ernment is that there is no ev idence
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the ex traterritorial statutory specificity to relev ant criminal statutes,
mindful of the transnational ambiguities increasingly arising in the
absence of such direction.282 It could also strip federal courts of jurisdiction when an indiv idual has been abducted from abroad in contrav ention of a bilateral ex tradition treaty.
As is typical with federal criminal legislation, the ex ecutiv e
branch may be the one instigatingsuch changes.283 For ex ample, in the
wake of the Sanchez-Llamas decision discussed abov e, DOJ lobbied
for amendment of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to ensure
that magistrate judges apprise foreign nationals of their consular
rights during the initial appearance.284 As noted in the Committee
Notes, the amendments to Rules 5 (initial appearance) and 58 (petty
offenses and other misdemeanors) were necessary giv en that “many
questions remain unresolv ed by the courts concerning Article 36,
includingwhether it creates indiv idual rights that may be inv oked in a
judicial proceeding and what, if any, remedy may ex ist for [its]
v iolation.”285
Recent passage of the Clarifying Lawful Ov erseas Use of Data
Act (CLOUD Act) is another case in point.286 The 2018 United States
v. Microsoft Corp. 287 case was one in which Congress acted to resolv e
a dispute regardingthe ex traterritoriality of a statute, i.e., a challenge
to a warrant issued under § 2703 of the Stored Communications Act
(SCA) requiring Microsoft to disclose emails stored on one of its
serv ers located in Ireland.288 The Second Circuit had ruled that the
SCA lacked ex traterritorial effect,289 and Judge Lynch, in concurrence, noted that the decision was “the application of a default rule of
statutory interpretation to a statute that [did] not prov ide an ex plicit
answer to the question,”290 and thus Congress should rev ise and mod-
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that Congress has ever weighed the costs and benefits of authorizing [such] court orders
. . . .” Id. at 231.
291 Id. at 233 (“[T]he statute should be rev ised, with a v iew to maintaining and
strengtheningthe Act’s priv acy protections, rationalizingand modernizingthe prov isions
. . . .”).
292 Brief for the United States at 20–21, United States v . Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186
(2018) (No. 17-2) (noting that the proper focus of an ex traterritoriality analysis is the
statutory prov ision at issue, not the statute as a whole).
293 Brief in Opposition at 27, Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (No. 17-2).
294 Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1188; see also CLOUD Act, Pub. L. No. 115-141, 132
Stat. 1214 (2018).
295 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S CYBER DIGITAL
TASK FORCE 114 (2018), https://www.justice.gov /ag/page/file/1076696/download.
296 CLOUD Act §§ 103(a)(1), 104(1)(A)(j) (“A [serv ice prov ider] shall comply with the
obligations of this chapter . . . regardless of whether such communication, record, or other
information is located within or outside of the United States.”). Subsequently, the
gov ernment obtained a new warrant for the sought-after information pursuant to the
amended SCA prov ision. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1188.
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ernize the statute.291 In their Supreme Court briefings, both parties
referenced the RJR Nabisco test in formulating their positions. The
gov ernment argued that the focus of the section was a prov ider’s disclosure of information, which occurs in the United States and thus
should be considered territorial.292 By contrast, Microsoft focused on
storage, asserting that because the information is stored in serv ers
located in a foreign country, the gov ernment’s warrant reaches abroad
and thus is impermissibly ex traterritorial regardless of Microsoft’s
ability to access that information in the United States.293 In April
2018, howev er, the Supreme Court dismissed the case as moot after
the parties adv ised that no liv e dispute ex isted in the wake of the
March 2018 passage of the CLOUD Act.294 The Act, which was
passed into law after both the DOJ and priv ate sector lobbied for statutory change,295 amended the SCA by addinga prov ision statingthat
an internet serv ice prov ider may be compelled under the SCA to produce electronic data stored outside of the United States.296 In other
words, in this situation and at the instigation of the ex ecutiv e branch,
Congress laudably prov ided the necessary statutory clarity regarding
the ex traterritorial reach of a statute relev ant to inv estigations in foreign affairs prosecutions, obv iating the need for continued litigation
under an uncertain test for criminal ex traterritoriality.
Such congressional clarity would desirably uphold criminal legal
v alues of statutory specificity and notice, decreasingambiguity in this
transnational space. Indeed, what characterizes criminal law most is
the stakes: the grav ity of the offenses; the resulting punishments,
which include incarceration or ev en ex ecution; and a concern for the
liberty interests of the defendant because of such consequences.
Giv en such stakes, statutory specificity, not to mention checks on gov -
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297 See 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (2012) (identifyingprocedures by which a federal judge certifies
ex tradition to the Secretary of State); id. § 3186 (Secretary of State to surrender fugitiv e).
298 Mutual legal assistance, by contrast, is conducted solely by DOJ. See U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL § 276, https://www.justice.gov /jm/criminalresource-manual-276-treaty-requests (last v isited Feb. 16, 2019) (“All treaties currently in
force designate the Department of Justice as the ‘central authority’ assigned to make the
request; because of those prov isions, the request is signed in the Department rather than
by a judge.”).
299 See supra Section II.C.
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ernment power—includingthe doubled ex ecutiv e-ex ecutiv e power in
such cases—are ev en more necessary. This means that the legislature
must play a greater role in negotiating the emerging area of foreign
affairs prosecutions, and the judiciary must then play its role in
ensuring that such criminal laws do not v iolate constitutional and
other norms.
Congressional action could also clarify inter-agency relationships,
inuringto the benefit of foreign policy. So, for ex ample, federal ex tradition law currently identifies the Secretary of State as the actor who
surrenders a fugitiv e to another country at the end of the ex tradition
process.297 This requirement by definition giv es the State Department
v isibility into the ex tradition process, albeit in one that it has limited
control ov er giv en that the cases originate in the U.S. criminal justice
system.298 Congress could similarly take the lead in “hardwiring” a
State Department role into other aspects of cross-border inv estigation
and prosecution.
Let us turn back to our original hypothetical,299 then, under this
modified judicial posture and legislativ e structure. First, relyingmore
readily on ordinary judicial interpretativ e tools, the New York federal
court would find your transnational kidnapping unlawful under the
U.S.-Canada ex tradition treaty. Alternativ ely, it could rule that it
lacks personal jurisdiction ov er you pursuant to a nov el statute stripping courts of personal jurisdiction ov er defendants abducted from
abroad. Second, the court would either rule that the bribery statute
encompassed ex traterritorial conduct because Congress had giv en that
ex plicit guidance, or would dismiss the charge because, under the rule
of lenity, the lack of any indication of Congress’s intent for ex traterritorial application represents an ambiguity that should not be construed against the defendant. But the court would uphold the nearly
three-year delay in indictment, finding that 18 U.S.C. § 3292 is sufficiently clear on its face and consistent with the legislativ e purpose of
facilitating the logistical realities of cross-border criminal
inv estigations.
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CONCLUSION
Foreign affairs prosecutions represent a consequential shift in
U.S. criminal law and promote accountability for cross-border, cyber,
and international crime. But none of the three branches of gov ernment fully apprehend the hybrid nature of foreign affairs prosecutions, which engage the ex ecutiv e branch as both prosecutor and
diplomat. This raises the specter of underminingcriminal process at
home and splintering foreign policy abroad. Congressional engagement and judicial ov ersight are important first steps in ensuring the
promise—and av oidingthe perils—of these critical cases.
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